AN ASSIGNOR OR GUARANTOR.

26. And the courts will presume the endorsemaent was made at
the time and place stated on the face of the note; or at the time
and place of its execution: Dawson v. V'aughan, 42 Ind. 395;
-Pattersonv. Carrell, 60 Id. 128; Kestner v. Spath, 53 Id. 288;
contra, -Edwardsv. Shields, 7 Bradw. 70. If it appears that note
was endorsed in another state, and the law of that state on the liability of endorsers is not plead and proven, the common law of the
forum will be applied in adjudging the rights of the parties: Patterson v. Carrell, supra. Executed in one state and endorsed
in another, liability is fixed by the law of the latter state: Schuttler
v. Piatt, 12 111. 417.

W. W.

THORNTON.

Crawfordsville, Ind.
(To be continued.)
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CLARKE v. INIMLWALL DOCK COMPANY.
Things belonging to a third person, which are on the demised premises for the purpose of being wrought up or manufactured by the tenant in the way of his trade, are
not privileged from distress by the landlord, unless they have been sent or delivered
by such third person to the tenant for that purpose.

APPEAL from a judgment of POLLOCK, B. Claim for 17211. as
damages for the wrongful detention by the defendants of a ship
called the Swillington, the property of the plaintiff as executor of
W. France, deceased.
The defence in substance was that the defendants lawfully
detained the ship upon premises occupied by one Gilbert, as tenant
to the defendants, under a distress for arrears of rent due from him
to them ; that they detained the ship for a reasonable time, until
they were paid the sum of 17211., being the amount of arrears of
rent, and then delivered it to the plaintiff and Gilbert.
The action was tried by POLLOCK, B., without a jury, at the
Middlesex sittings in June 1885, when the material facts proved in
evidence, or admitted, were as follows:
In 1882, Gilbert contracted to build for France a steamship
according to certain specifications and models. The contract was
contained in correspondence between the parties, and by the terms of
it the price was to be 80001., to be paid by nine equal instalments,
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each instalment to become due as certain specified parts of the ship
were completed.
Gilbert began the work about the end of November 1882, in a
dry-dock occupied by him as tenant to the defendants.
France died on the 27th of August 1883, and the plaintiff was
the sole executor of his will.
On the 11th of September 1883, the defendants seized the ship
upon the premises let to Gilbert, under a distress for arrears of rent,
amounting to 17211., due from Gilbert to them in respect of his
tenancy of the dry-dock.
The ship was detained by the defendants under the distress until
the 2d of October 1883, when the plaintiff paid the sum of 17211.
to the defendants under protest, in order to obtain the release of
the ship, and the defendants thereupon gave up possession of the
ship.
At the date of the execution of the warrant of distress, the ship
was nearly completed, and France had paid all the instalments due
under his contract with Gilbert as each part of the ship was built.
During the progress of the work the materials and things necessary to carry out the building of the ship were supplied to Gilbert
by the various makers thereof, and no materials had been sent or
delivered by France or the plaintiff to Gilbert to be used for the
building of the ship.
On these facts, POLLOCK, B., gave judgment for the defendants,
holding that the ship was not privileged from distress for rent at the
time the defendants seized and detained it, and therefore that the
detention was lawful.
The plaintiff appealed.
.Finlay, Q. 0., (McCall, with him), for the plaintiff.
Cohen, Q. C., and

. Graham, for the defendants.

HERSOHELL, L. 0.-The sole question in this case is whether an
unfinished ship, which was being built for the plaintiffs, in a drydock rented by the builder from the defendants, was or was not
exempt from distress for rent. The defendants distrained the ship,
and the plaintiff alleges that the distress was unlawful because the
property was in him, and the circumstances were such as to exempt
the ship from distress. There is no question that, prima facie, all
goods found on the demised premises are subject to distress, but it
is said that this case comes within one of the exceptions which have

CLARKE v. MILWALL DOCK CO.

been engrafted on the general law. The facts are that Gilbert,
having rented the dry-dock from the defendants, entered into a contract with the plaintiff's testator to build for him this ship ; the
price was to be paid in equal instalments, each instalment becoming
due as certain portions of the ship were completed. The instalments
due had been paid and the work was approaching completion.
It is not necessary to decide whether, when the instalments were
paid, the property in the ship passed to the plaintiff, though the
case of Clark v. Spence, 4 A. & E. 448, certainly affords strong
ground for saying that it did pass. Assuming that it did, it is, at
least, equally clear from the same case that Gilbert was entitled to
retain the ship for the purpose of finishing it and earning the
rermaining instalments. The exception which is said to apply here
is that described in the 2d rule stated by WILLES, 0. J., in Simpson
v. Hastopp, Willes 512. That rule has been laid down in substantially the same terms in Gisbourr v. Hurst, 1 Salk. 249. It was
repeated in tuspratt v. Gregory, 1 M. & W. 633, 3 Id. 677, and
has been acted upon in many other cases. Assuming that, as I have
said, the property of the ship was in the plaintiff when the distress
was made, the case is one of property belonging to another being on
the demised premises, and so far, therefore within the rule. I agree
also that the ship was on Gilbert's premises for the purpose of being
"wrought, worked up, or managed in the way of his trade or employ."
But it is contended by the defendants that, though on Gilbert's
premises for these purposes, there was no thing delivered to him
within the meaning of the exception. On the other hand it is said
that there need not be a delivery; that it is enough if the goods are
on the premises for the purpose of being wrought and worked up;
and that when the principle is looked at upon which the exception is
founded, it does not necessarily involve the idea of delivery. But
I am of opinion that we are limited in this case by the strict terms
of the exception. It is very difficult to find any sound principle
upon which to explain the law of distress and to support the various
decisions. No doubt the general law which enables a landlord to
distrain the goods of a third person upon the tenant's premises is, as
was said in the argument, anomalous, and the exception in question
is also anomalous. I think that we cannot go beyond the terms of
the definition of the exception. There have been many cases in
which the courts would be disposed to go beyond those terms, as in
Wood v. Clarke, 1 0. & J. 484, but in that case it was held that,
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though materials delivered by a manufacturer to a weaver to be manufactured by him on his own premises were privileged from distress,
a frame delivered with the materials to be used in the manufacture
was not privileged, unless there was otherwise a sufficient distress
upon the premises, because it did not come within the terms of the
exception. Looking at the terms of the exception it is as much a
necessary part of it that the goods should be delivered for the purpose of being wrought, worked up, or managed in the way of trade,
as that they should be on the demised premises for those purposes.
There is no more reason for rejecting the term "delivered" from
the exception than there is for rejecting the term with respect to
the goods being on the demised premises to be wrought, &c., in the
way of trade. I am of opinion that the exemption must be limited
to cases in which there has been a delivery for the purpose of trade,
and that it does not extend to all cases in which goods are on the
premises for those purposes. If we might consider the question
of principle, delivery of the goods for the purposes of trade may
be essential, because the exception was probably founded on the
view, that when a person having the right to possession, parts with
the possession, and intrusts his goods to another for the purposes
specified in the exception, and by parting with the possession
renders the goods physically subject to seizure upon that other's
premises, the goods ought not to be thereby rendered liable at law
to distress.
I do not mean to decide that that is the principle, but it may as
well be that as any other principle. It is sufficient here to say that
we cannot reject the word "delivered" in applying the exception.
It was said, on behalf of the plaintiff, that the term " delivered" is
not found in the exception as stated by Coke (Coke, Litt. 47 a)
and Blackstone (3 Comm. 8), and in some of the older authorities.
True, but both in Coke and Blackstone the exception is stated in
terms so large as to include cases with respect to which a course of
decisions has established that the goods are not privileged from distress; and all the illustrations given by Coke and Blackstone of
cases within the exception, imply the idea of delivery of the goods
for the specified purposes. In the present case there was no delivery
in any sense of the term. The goods were originally in the possession of Gilbert for the purpose of building the ship; they remained
in his possession until the first instalment was paid, and up to that
time were liable to distress for rent owing to his landlord. After
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the first instalment was paid, the possession remained in Gilbert, and
France and the plaintiff, as his executor, had only the property in
them. That being so, can it be said that, giving the widest interpretation to the term "delivered," there was any delivery here
within the meaning of the exceptions ? I think the facts dispose of
the suggestion that there was any such delivery. As to the illustrations put in the argument, when an article is delivered to be
repaired or altered the privilege of the exception would clearly
apply, and when a carriage is built for a purchaser, and when it
has been completed and paid for, the purchaser allows it to remain
on the builder's premises for the purpose of having some alterations
made, I will not say that those facts might not constitute a delivery
within the meaning of the exception, because the purchaser having
the right to possession has intrusted the possession to the builder
for the purpose of altering the carriage. -Here the purchaser of
the ship never had the right to possession at any time. He had the
property in the ship, but the possession always remained with
Gilbert.
I arrive at my conclusions in this case with some regret, but
the exception has been laid down in these terms and acted upon for
so many years, that it is now impossible to extend it by judicial construction. If extended it must be by the interference of the legislature. For these reasons I am of the opinion that the decision of
POLLOCK, B., was right, and must be affirmed.
Lord ESHER, M. R.-The law with respect to goods privileged
from distress is part of the common law. It has been stated over
and over again, and is final by the judgment of WILLES, 0. J., in
Simpson v. ifartop, Willes 512. That learned judge's statement
of the law was made after very careful consideration, and has always
been accepted as true and correct. He laid down five exceptions
to the general law in the form of rules. Some of these rules apply
to goods which are the property of the person upon whose premises
the distress is made. The rule in question applies to goods which
are the property, not of the person upon whose premises the distress is made, but of another, and it is in these terms: "Things
delivered to a person exercising a public trade to be carried, wrought,
worked up, or managed in the way of his trade or employ." Afterward, in the same judgment, the chief justice stated the rule again,
and pointed out the reason for it, thus: "Things sent or delivered
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to a person exercising a trade, to be carried, wrought, or manufactured in the way of his trade, as a horse in a smith's shop, materials
sent to a weaver, or cloth to be made up, are privileged for the sake
of trade or commerce, which could not be carried on if such things,
under these circumstances, could be distrained for rent due from the
person in whise custody they are." Now all the exceptions are
stated in the form of rules, not of principles ; and that distinction
was upheld by the Court of Exchequer Chamber in'Zttuspratt v.
Gregory, 1 M. & W. 633, 3 Id. 677, where the court was asked
to find that they were principles, but refused to do so. The rule
in question is stated to be " for the sake of trade and commerce."
If that reason, contained in the rule itself, as stated by WILLES, C.
J., be the real reason for the rule, I think it is absolutely necessary
to say that the words "sent or delivered" form an essential part of
it. It is the principal essence of the rule, contained in the first
part of it, and founded upon the idea that a man would not send or
deliver goods if they were liable to be distrained upon. They are
to be sent by a person whose property they are, and they are to be
sent to a person exercising a trade, to be wrought, etc., "in the
way of his trade or employ." If something is delivered which it is
not part of his trade or employment to deal with, the thing
delivered is not privileged from distress. The case was put in
argument of goods not sent or delivered, but manufactured into
some article upon the tenant's premises, and it was said that under
certain circumstances there might be something equivalent to a
delivery within the meaning of the rule. I should say that it is
true, if the article to be manufactured has been completed, and the
person who has the property in it leaves it upon the demised premises in order to have some alteration made, because the law would
not require him to go through the idle ceremony of taking the
article away and returning it. In such a case I think there would
be an equivalent to delivery of the thing manufactured. Here
nothing was sent or delivered in any sense. I will assume, as the
Lord Chancellor has done, that the property in the ship passed to
the plaintiff or his testator when the instalments of the price were
paid, but it is a necessary implication from the contract that the
ship-builder had the right to possession, and the plaintiff had no
such right, until the ship was completed. The plaintiff never had
possession of the ship in fact; he never sent or delivered it to Gilbert, and there was nothing in the transaction between them equiv-
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alent to sending or delivering. I am, therefore, of opinion that the
rule does not apply to this case, and that the ship was not privileged
from distress under the circumstances.
am of the same opinion. The statement of the
FRY, L. J.-I
rule in Gisbourn v. Hurst, 1 Salk. 249, was accepted in Simpson
v. ffartopp, Willes 512, which has ever since been the leading case
on the subject, and all the illustrations of that rule involve the idea
of sending or delivery of some article to the person on whose premises the distress is made. I am of opinion that we are not at
liberty to depart from that rule, which was also accepted as a
binding exposition of the law in the year 1838, in Afuspratt v.
Gregory, 1 M. & W. 633 ; 3 Id. 677. It is to be observed that in
all cases to which the rule has been applied there was, in fact, a
sending or delivery. In Muspratt v. Gregory, the court clearly
thought that the sending or delivery was an important part of the
rule; and it is impossible not to see that sending or delivery is
important in considering the question of principle. The rule would
be greatly enlarged if the words "sent or delivered" were struck
out, because, as it stands, the rule only applies where the right to
possession in the goods has been in the person for whom they are
being wrought or manufactured. I assume that the property was
in the plaintiff in this case, but in order to make the rule apply, I
think that both the property and the right to possession should be
in a person who delivers the goods for the purpose of having them
wrought, &c., in the way of trade. There is no pretence for saying
that the plaintiff was entitled to possession of the ship in question
here. There may, perhaps, be cases in which a constructive delivery
would be sufficient, but here there was no equivalent for actual
delivery. I am of opinion that the defendants are entitled, to our
Appeal dismissed.
judgment.
.Exemptionfrom Distress. " Benefit
of Trade."-At common law, the landlord could distrain for rent upon any
goods found upon the demised premises :
583; Wood.
Taylor Land. & Ten.
543; 3 Blk. Com.
Land. & Ten.
8; even though they belonged to some
third person : 3 Blk. Com. 7 ; Keller
v. Weber, 27 Aid. 660; Spencer v. MeGowen, 13 Wend. 256 ; Blancie v.
Bradford, 38 Penn. St. 344; Kessler v.
Foe. XXXV.-20

McConachy, 1 fRawle 435; Adams v. La
Comb, 1 Dall. 440 ; Kleber v. Ward, 88
Penn. St. 93. To this general rule, subjecting the goods of a stranger to distress
by a landlord, there is an important exception. "Things delivered to any person (tenant) exercising a public trade or
employment, to be carried, wrought or
managed, in the way of his trade or employ, are for that time under a legal protection, and privileged from distress for
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rent :" Gisbourn v. Hurst, I Salk. 249.

tire court that the yarn was not distrain-

See also, 2d exception in Simpson v.
Rartopp, Willes 512.
This exception was very early established in the English law. In 10 Henry
7, p. 21, pl. 18, it was agreed by the
court, that a horse in a hostelry could
not be distrained, nor a robe being made
up in a tailor shop. To the same effect
are 22 Edw. 4, 49 b., and 7 Henry 7, 1
pl. 1. These early cases do not attempt
to lay down any precise rule upon the
subject, but merely enumerate certain
special cases where the exemption applies.
Nor do they agree as to the principle of
the exemption. The cases of exemption
cited do not present any very striking
similarity. They are goods sent to a
public market or fair to be sold; goods
of a guest at an inn; a horse sent to a
smith's to be shod ; corn sent to a mill
to be ground ; goods sent to a tailor to
be made up into clothes. In 7 Henry 7,
1, pl. 1, the court, speaking of the exemption of goods of a guest in a hostelry,
and goods placed in a market or fair,
say that it would be to the prejudice of
the "common weal" to allow a distress
in such a case. In 22 Edw. 4, 49,
Bnr.Ax, J., speaking of the exemption
of goods of a guest at an inn, or a robe
being made at a tailor's, seems to base the
right of exemption upon the ground that
the goods are there by the ' authority of
the law ;" that the innkeeper or tailor is
obliged to receive the goods, and has a
lien upon them for his pay: In the case
of Read v. Burley, reported twice in Cro.
Eliz., once at p. 549, and again at p.
596, it appears, according, to the first report, that the plaintiff, a cloth-worker, left
certain wool with the tenant, to spin into
yarn. Afterwards, he came on horseback to get the yarn. It was necessary
to weigh the yarn, and the tenant having
no scales, he sent to the next village for
some, and, in the meanwhile, the defendant distrained the yarn which was on
plaintiff's shoulders, and also on plaintiff's horse. It was agreed by the en-

able, it being in the actual possession of
the plaintiff. WAlasLEY, T., was of
opinion that the horse was distrainable.
He distinguished the case of a horse at
an inn, on the ground that the exemption
in that case is " in favor for the benefit
of the commonwealth; because a common hostelry is a common place where
men are to herbage."
But BEAuDzOND
and OwEN, JJ., were of opinion that
the horse was not distrainable. " For
the trade of cloth-workers is necessary
and to be favored ; and this horse is not
to be distrained, no more than a horse
which carries corn to market, and is put
into a friend's house for the time; he is
not distrainable (which WA.LssIEy denied). And where a horse carries corn
to a mill, and is tied at the mill-doors
during the grinding of the corn, he shall
not be distrained (which WALxsaxy
agreed) : because it is a common place,
and for the public weal: but they are
not alike." It was afterwards adjudged
that the distress was not lawful.
In the report of the case, Cro. Eliz.
596, the facts are differently stated. It
is there stated that the plaintiff went with
his horse and the yarn, to the premises
of a neighbor, who had scales, and that
the distress was made there. According

to this report,

ANDERSON, BEAUXOND,

and OwEN, J,., held the yarn and
horse not distrainable, for the trade of
a clothier is pro bone publico, who ought
to be allowed all necessary means; and
without doubt, cloth put to a weaver to
be woven, or yarn in a house to be spun,
are not distrainable (quod WAL tSLEY
agreed) : and weighing is as necessary
as the former; wherefore the yarn
brought thither for that purpose, and the
horse which brought it, are privileged,
and are not distrainable. WAL.M5LEY,,
J., disagreed, "because itis not averred
that it was a common beam, or place of
weighing."
The earlier cases seem to base the exemption upon the most general ground
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of public policy. In this case it is put
upon a more limited ground, that of benefit to trade. But the judges give a very
wide scope to benefit of trade. They
seem to hold that when the goods are
brought upon the premises for any purpose, in any way connected with trade,
the goods are exempt. It is to be noticed that, in the second report, it appears
that the goods were not distrained for the
rent of the spinner, but for the rent owed
by the owner of the scales. Moreover,
the principle of "benefit of trade" was
applied, not in the favor of the trade of
the tenant, but in favor of that of the
owner of the goods. WALMrSLEY, who
dissented, appears to have thought that
the exemption was confined to goods in
public places.
Lord Corm, in his Commentary upon
Littleton, says, (Co.
Litt. 47 a):
"Valuable things shall not be distrained
for rent, for benefit and maintenance of
trades, which by consequent, are for the
benefit of the Commonwealth, and are
there by authority of law ; as a horse in
a smith's shop, shall not be distrained for
rent issuing out of the shop, nor the horse,
&e., in the hostelry, nor the materials in
the weaver's shop, nor sacks of corn or
meal in a mill, nor in a market, nor anything distrained for damage feasant, for
it is in custody of law and the like."
This seems to state a general principle
rather than a fixed rule, and did not, in
any way, limit the doctrine of the preceding cases.
In (r'isbourn v. Hurst, I Salk. 249,
goods were delivered to a private carrier
to be carried from London to Birmingham. The carrier apparentlylived somewhere on the road between London and
Birmingham, and when he reached home
he put his wagon with the goods into the
barn, where it was, on the next day but
one, distrained. It was held that the
goods were exempt from distress.
It
was agreed by the court that1"goods
delivered to any person exercising a public trade or employment, to be carried,

wrought or managed in the way of
his trade or employ, are for that time
under a legal protection, and privileged
from distress for rent." The court at
first doubted whether the fact that the
carrier was a private, not a common
carrier, did not make a difference, but
finally held that it did not, "the privilege being in respect of the trades, and
not in respect of the carrier."
Here we
have the exemption for benefit of trade
stated in a much more restricted way
than heretofore. It would seem that this
statement of the exemption would not
include the case of Read v. Burly, supra.
This statement of the rule or principle
of the exemption for the benefit of trade
was borrowed by WILLEs, J., in Simpson v. Hartopp, Willes 512.
In Fowkes v. Joyce, 3 Lev. 260, a
drover driving cattle to the London market, put them into the tenant's close for
the night, where they were distrained by
the landlord. It was held that cattle
were not exempt. The distinction between this case and Gisbourn v. Hurst,
supra, seems to be, that in that case the
goods were distrained on the premises of
the carrier, and for his rent, while here,
the cattle were distrained on the premises
and for the rent of a third person.
So in Crosier v. Tonkinson, 2 Ld.
Ken. 439, it was held that a landlord
could distrain the horse of a guest at an
inn, in a stable, sublet by the tenant to
the innkeeper during certain races. This
case seems to show that the exemption
of goods of a guest is only from distress
by the innkeeper's landlord.
In Francis v. Wfjatt, 3 Burr. 1498, it
was held that a carriage kept at a livery
stable was not exempt from distress.
The court distinguished the case of a
horse or coach left at the stable of an inn
by a guest, on the ground that in the latter case the innkeeper is obliged to take
the property, and has a lien upon it for
his charges, while, in the care of a livery
stable keeper, the taking charge of the
property is wholly a matter of contract.
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In the former case the property is on the
demised premises by "authority of law"
in the latter case, not. It would seem,
however, that the coach might have been
held exempt, under the general rule
exempting goods delivered to any person
exercising a public trade, to be managed
in the way of his employ. This point
was taken by counsel, bat seems to have
been overlooked by the court, or else the
court was of opinion that a livery stable
keeper was not engaged in a public employ. But if the case intended to limit
the exemption to employments, public in
the sense in which an innkeepers or carrier's occupation is public, it was clearly
erroneous, and has been overruled. The
case was followed in Parsonsv. Gingell,
4 C. B. 545. In this country it has been
held that horses and vehicles kept in a livery stable, are exempted from distress on
the principle of "benefit of trade:"
Youngbloodv. Lowry, 2 MeCord (S. C.)
39.
In Wood v. Clarke, 1 C. & J. 484, it
was sought to exempt a stocking frame
delivered by a hosiery manufacturer to
a stocking weaver to work up yarn into
stockings, on the theory of "benefit of
trade," but the court held that it could
not be exempted from distress on this
theory, although it was alleged in the
pleadings that it was the usage of trade
to deliver frames to weavers, for the purpose of working up yarn. The court
stated that the case did not fall within the
authority of any decided cases, and refused to extend the principle beyond decided cases. (In Simpson v. Hartopp,
Willes 512, and Goton v. Fllner,4 T.
1. 565, it was held that, in such a case,
the loom might be exenpted as" utensils
of trade," if there were other sufficient
distress on the premises.)
These cases indicate a tendency to restrict narrowly the exemption of goods
from distress on the theory of "benefit
of trade." In the great case of Muspratt v. Gregory, I M. & W. 633, it was
finally decided that this exception was

not to be extended beyond the actual precedents-that it was not a general principle but a fixed rule of law. In that
case, the terre-tenant was a salt manufacturer, and the course of his business was
to deliver the salt upon boats of his customers, in a certain canal dug along side
of the works. The plaintiff's boat, while
in this canal for the purpose of being
loaded with salt, was distrained. The
majority of the Court of Exchequer were
of opinion that the boat was not exempt
on the theory of benefit of trade, because
not within that exemption, as stated in
Simpson v. Hartopp, or within any of the
decided cases.
ALDERSON, B., lays
down the rule of that exemption as follows: "The true principle seems to be,
that where, in order to the exercising
such a public trade at the place in question, it is necessary that the goods should
be delivered into the custody of the person carrying it on there, the law, in consideration of the benefit which the Commonwealth derives from the carrying on
of the trade, protects from distress the
goods so delivered." PAnKE, B., dissented ; he was ofopinion that the "benefit of trade" exemption was a broad
principle, and not a fixed rule. That
the statement of that principle in Simpson v. Hartapp,was clearly too narrow,
inasmuch as it did not cover the case of
goods sent to market, or a horse or
vehicle sent to or waiting for goods
to be brought from the place where the
trade is carried on, all of which cases
come within the exemption.
That
the true principle was that goods necessarily placed upon the demised premises in the way of the tenant's trade,
if that trade is to be made available to
the public, were exempt ; and that in
the carrying on of the trade in the mode
in which the salt manufacturer held himself out as carrying it on, that is by selling salt to all who should send their boats
to his works, the delivery of the boats
for the purpose of being loaded, was
necessarily required.
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The dissenting of PRKE, B., is
marked by great learning and acumen,
and is in no way unworthy of that very
great judge. Nevertheless, the opinion
of the majority prevailed, and the judgment of the court was affirmed on appeal, (3 M. & W. 678).
Indeed, in Joule v. Jackson, 7 M. &W.
450, PARKE, B., concurred in the deci-

sion of the court while holding that beer
casks of a brewer, left at a public house
while the beer was being drawn, were
not exempt from distress, and stated that
the case of Muspratt v. Gregory, had
conclusively settled that the exemption
ought not to be extended beyond the
decided cases.
The words "pu b lic trade" occurring
in Willes' second exemptions (stated in
Simpson v. Rartopp, supra), have given

the judges some difficulty. In Gibson
v. Ireson, 3 Q. B. 39, the court confess
that they are unable to define or state the
exact meaning of the phrase "public
trade or employ."
They point out that
it must mean something different from
a public occupation, in the sense in which
an innkeeper's or carrier's occupation is
public, since it is conceded that a tailor
is engaged in a "public trade" within
the role. Baron PARE, infMuspratt v.
Gregory, supra, said, that a "public
trade" was merely a trade " carried on
generally for the benefit of any persons
who choose to avail themselves of it; as
distinguished from a special employment
by one or more particular individuals."
This seems to be the true definition of
the phrase.
And where a manufacturing company
has an agency for the sale of its goods,
and the agent rents the store where they
are sold, and sells on commission, it
seems that he does not carry on a "publietrade or employ" within the meaning
of the rule, and hence his landlord may
distrain goods of his principal, stored on
his premises awaiting sale: Taplin9 4Co. v. Weston, Cobab6 & Ellis (Eng. Q.
B. D.) 99. But oontra, see Howe Sewing

Machine Co. v. Sloan, 87 Penn. St.
438.
In the United States the exemptions
for the benefit of trade are more liberally
construed than in England. Thus in
Youngblood v. Loiwry, 2 AfcCord (S.
C.) 39, it was held that vehicles and
horses being kept in a livery stable, were
exempt from distress for the livery-man's
rent, and in Riddle v. Velden, 5 Whart.
(Pa.) 9, it was held that the goods of a
boarder were not liable to distress for
rent, due from the keeper of the boarding house, and the court speak of Francisv. Wyatt, supra, as an " apocryphal case." So, in Cadwaladerv. Tindall, 20 Penn. St. 422, it was held that
cattle sent to be agisted, were exempt
from distress by the agistor's landlord.
But in Karns v. M:Kinney, 74 Penn.
St. 387, where A. bought lumber of the
tenant, and by his permission, left it on
the premises, where he proceeded to work
it up into barges, it was held that the
property was not exempt from distress.
And in Price v. 3tcCallister,3 Grant
Cas. (Pa.) 248, it was held that a billiard table rented to a saloon-keeper, was
not exempt from distress by saloonkeeper's landlord.
It is well settled, both in England and
in this country, that the benefit of trade
exemption covers goods left for purposes
of sale or storage. Thus, in Matthias v.
Mllesnord, 2 C. & P. 353, it was held that
corn sent to a factor for sale, and deposited by him in a warehouse, is, while
there, exempt from distress by the warehouseman's landlord : Thompson v.
Alashiter, 1 Bing. 283 : Connah v. Hale,
23 Wend. (N. Y.) 462, accord. So,
where the goods are stored by the factor
on his own premises awaiting sale, they
are not distrainable for rent due from
him : Gilman v. Elton, 3 Bred. & B. 75 ;
Findon v. McLaren, 6 Q. B. 891 ; Miles
v. Furber,L. R., 8 Q. B. 77 ; Brown v.
Sims, 17 S. & R. 138 ; Beran v. Crooks,
7 W. & S. 452 ; contra, vide Elford v.
Clark, 2 Brev. (S. C.) 88.
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Similarly, goods sent to an auctioneer
to be sold, are exempt from distress
while on his premises : Williams v.
Holmes, 8 Ex. 861 ; Brown v. Arundell,
100. B. 54 ; Adams v. Crane, 3 Tyrwh.
327; Himely v. Wyatt, I Bay (S. C.)
102. But the goods are only exempted
from the distress of the auctioneer's landlord. Hence, where an auction sale was
to take place on the premises of A., and
B. requested the auctioneer to include in
the sale, certain goods of his, and the
goods were accordingly delivered to the
auctioneer, upon the premises of A.,
and were there distrained by A.'s landlord, it was held that they were not exempt: Lyons v. Elliott, L. R., I Q. B.
Div. 210.
Goods pledged with a pawnbroker may
not be distrained by the pawnbroker's
landlord: Swire v. Leach, 18 C. B. (N.
S.) 479.
The exemption for the benefit of trade,
is for the benefit of the trade carried on
by the tenant: Muspratt v. Gregory, I
M. & W. 633. Hence itis immaterial who
the person delivering the goods to be
"wrought, worked up or managed,"
may be. So where one butcher delivers
cattle to another to be slaughtered, they
are exempt from distress, for rent due
from the second butcher : Brown v. Shevill,
2 Ad. & El. 138.
The question as to how long goods
left to be worked up, or repaired, &c.,
are exempted after the work is completed,
and the goods are ready to be removed,
seems never to have been passed upon.
It seems probable, however, that they
are exempt until the owner has had a

reasonable time to remove them, and that
the court would be inclined to be lenient
in its construction of what constitutes a
reasonable time. See 22 E. 4, 49 b.
Where the landlord has goods of a
stranger, brought upon the demised premises, he cannot distrain them, although
they were originally there and were removed by the owner, without his consent
after rent was in arrear : Patonv. Carter, Cabab6 & Ellis (Eng. Q. B. D.)
183. So where the landlord expressly or
impliedly agrees that the goods of the
stranger shall not be distrained, the right
of distress is waived: Horsford v. Webster, 5 Tyrwh. 409.
The rule for the distress for rent of
cattle of a stranger trespassing upon the
demised premises, seems to be that they
are liable to distress as soon as they
come on the premises: 7 Henry 7, 1 pl.
1 ; Co. Litt. 47. But if they come on
the demised premises through the failure of the tenant to fence against them,
they are not distrainable until levant
and couchant, in order that the owner
may have time to remove them: 3 Blk.
Com. 9. In this country, in a case
where the judge delivering the opinion
was inclined to protest against the rule
allowing the landlord to distrain the
goods of a stranger found on the demised
premises, it was held, that where the
owner consented to his animals being
upon the demised premises, they were
liable to distress: Reeves v. McKenzie, I
Bailey (S. C.) 497.
Louis M. GnEEiLY.
Chicago, Ill.
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ROSS v. SILVER AND
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MINNESOTA ET AL.

Where a corporation is organized under a statute which permits such corporations
to sell their stock and provides that stock so sold purporting to be full paid shall not
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be liable to future assessments, it may sell at less than par value shares of capital
stock purportiug to be fully paid, and, if there be no fraud, the creditors of the corporation have no recourse against the purchasers or holders of such stock for the
difference between the par value and the price at which they were sold.

APPEAL from an order of the District Court, Hennepin county,
overruling separate demurrer of defendant to complaint, &c.

White

Reynolds, for respondent, Thomas Ross.

Lane, Dodge J- Cavanagh, for appellant, Heffelfinger.
-P. ff. Babcock, for appellant, Robert L. Kelly.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GILFILLAN, C. J.-This action is brought against the Silver and
Copper Island Mining Company and Kelly, Heffelfinger and Kimball, as its stockholders. Kelly and Heffelfinger interposed separate
demurrers to the complaint, which were overruled and an appeal
taken. The complaint sets forth the articles of incorporation.
From the articles it appears that the corporation was organized for
the purpose of mining, smelting, reducing, refining and working
ores and minerals, &c. ; that the capital stock was to be $2,000,000,
to be divided into shares of $2 each, to be paid up, and not to be subject to any further assessment in the hands of the lawful holder or
owner thereof, without his or their consent. The complaint alleges
that 850,000 shares were issued, and 150,000 reserved to raise funds
necessary to work and develop the mining property. November
28th 1882, a part of the shares reserved were, pursuant to a resolution of the board of directors, put up at auction, and sold, some at
four, some at five and some at six cents per share, each of the individual defendants purchasing some at such prices. The amounts
bid were paid, and the certificates of stock issued to the puiehasers,
expressing on their face that the shares were non-assessable. Afterwards plaintiff and one Nichols, under a contract with the corporation, did work for it to the amount of several thousand dollars.
Nichols assigned to the plaintiff, who recovered judgment against
the corporation, on which execution was issued and returned unsatisfied, all the property of the corporation liable to execution being
mortgaged far in excess of its value.
Plaintiff did not know of the sale of the stock till after the
recovery of said judgment. At the times of making the contract
to do the work, and the doing of it, the individual defendants were
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still stockholders. Plaintiff in this action seeks to charge them, as
for unpaid subscription, for as much as the difference between the
par value of the stock and what the defendants paid for it. The
theory of the action is that the capital stock of a corporation is a
trust fund for payment of its creditors; that persons trusting it have
,a right to assume that the amount of its stock issued indicates the
amount of actual assets in its hands, or subject to its call, to transact
its business and meet the demands of its creditors ; and that, therefore, a sale of its stock, as fully paid up, for less than its par value,
operates as a fraud upon those creditors, who had a right to rely
upon such stock as representing assets of the corporation upon which
they might rely; and, if the corporation make such sale, the purchasers may be called upon by such creditors to make good, so far
as necessary to pay their claims, the diterence between the par value
of the stock and the price at which it was sold.
This theory has strong considerations of equity and public policy
to commend it, and it is also supported by the weight of authority
in this country. Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States directly and fully sustain it. In the case of corporations
generally we see no good reason why the theory should not prevail.
fBut the legislature has seen fit to make special provision respecting
the disposal of stock by corporations for mining and smelting ores
and manufacturing metals, &c.; the provisions in regard to such corporations are contained in sections 144 to 154, inclusive, of chapter
84 of the general statutes of 1878. Section 149 provides : "the
stock of any such corporation shall be deemed personal property,
and may be issued, sold and transferred as may be prescribed by
resolution or by-laws of said corporation, or its managing board;
but no stock so issued or sold, purporting to be full paid, shall be
subject to any further assessment in the hands of the lawful holder
thereof without his consent."
This provision for sale of stock is peculiar to this class of corporations. The chapter contains provisions for the organization
and management of all manner of corporations, except those of a
municipal character; but there is no like provision in respect to
any except those organized for the business of mining and smelting
ores and manufacturing metals, &c. It is apparent that the legislature intended to make a distinction in the matter of the disposal
of stock between those corporations and others. The clause quoted
must be construed as authorizing such corporations to sell theii
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stock for whatever they can get, without regard to par value. They
may sell stock, "purporting to be full paid," though not in fact
full paid, and, when sold, "purporting to be full paid," it is not
subject to further assessment-there is no further claim upon it.
The legislature probably took the same view of such corporations
as is taken by the courts in California of similar corporations in
that state, In In re South Mountain, &c., Min. Co., 7 Sawy. 30,
s. c. 3 Fed. Rep. 403, Justice HOFFMAN said: "The mode in which
mining companies are formed in this state is familiar to us all.
The owners of the property, or persons expected to become such,
by complying with a few simple formalities, form themselves, with
such others as they may take into the association, into a corporation,
to which the property is conveyed. The amount of the capital,
which is required to be stated in the certificate of incorporation, is
usually fixed at a purely arbitrary sum, and divided into as many
shares as convenience or caprice may dictate. It neither bears, nor
is intended nor supposed by the public to bear, the slightest relation
to the real value of the property-a value nearly always conjectural,
and very often imaginary." Accordingly, it was held that creditors
have no recourse against stockholders who had paid in property for
stock declared to be fully paid up, for the difference between the
par value of the stock and the actual value of the property: 7
Sawy. 30; 5 Fed. Rep. 403; s. c. 8 Sawy. 366; 14 Fed. Rep.
347. Persons dealing with such a corporation must be held to do
so with knowledge that its stock may have been sold at less than
par, and purporting to have been full paid; that if so sold it is not
assessable, and consequently that the amount of its stock outstanding cannot be relied on as indicating the amount of actual assets
realized from its stock, and in its hands. There is, therefore, if
there be no fraud in fact, no equity in favor of creditors against
the purchasers of such stock at such a sale.
Order reversed.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE THAT A
SUBSCRIBER IS LIABLE FOR THE PAI
VALUE OF STOCK TAKEN.-It is a general proposition of law, so obvious in its
equity as to be almost axiomatic, that
joint enterprisors are liable for the obligations incurred in the prosecution of
their enterprise. The justice of this rule
needs no demonstration, since the joint
enterprisors are to have the benefits which
VOL.
-XX.21

result from the enterprise, it is right that
they should bear the burdens of it. This
rule of law finds illustration in the case
of a co-partnership, each of whose members is liable for all the debts and obligations of the firm. This rule of law is,
however, by no means without limitation
or exemption; even in the case of a partnership, statutes permit the firm to inelude a limited or special partner, who is
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not liable for the debts and obligations
of the concern, beyond the specific sum
of money which he contributes to its
capital, the so-called limited companies
present an example of further limitation
of the partners' liability, each one being
liable under the statute only for the money
represented by the number of shares
which he owns in the company. In this
respect, a limited company may be likened
to an ordinary corporation, each of whose
members or stockholders is liable only
for the amount of stock subscribed by
him, except where the statutes impose a
greater liability.
These exceptions to the rule that joint
enterprisors are liable for all the debts and
obligations of the enterprises in which
they are engaged, rest upon reasons of
public policy. It seems desirable, in order to promote new, and perhaps doubtful commercial enterprises, that those
who engage in them shall be permitted to
do so without risking their entire fortunes.
Especially for this reason is the rule making joint enterprisors liable for the debts
and obligations of their enterprise relaxed
in favor of mining enterprises. These are
often so difficult and doubtful in their outcome, that if extraordinary immunities
and privileges were not granted, they
would not be undertaken, and the public
would lose the benefit of many valuable
mines.
In California, the relaxation of the rule
that joint enterprisors are jointly and
severally liable for all the debts and obligations of the enterprises, finds expression in the statute quoted in the principal case, under which mining stock may
be purchased at less than its par value,
without making the stockholder liable for
such par value. In the absence of a
statute, however, custom appears to have
sanctioned a similar relaxation.
The
usage out of which such a custom has
arisen, is thus described by Judge SAwTER, in In re South Mountain Consolidated Mining Co., 7 Saw. 32: "1The
mode in which mining companies are

formed in this state (California), is
familiar to us all. The owners of the
property or persons expecting to become
such, by complying with a few simple
formalities, form themselves, with such
others as they may take into the association, into a corporation, to which the property is conveyed. The amount of the capital stock which is required to be stated in
the certificate of incorporation, is usually
fixed at a purely arbitrary sum, and divided into as may shares as convenience
or caprice may dictate. It neither bears,
nor is intended nor supposed by the publie to bear, the slightest relation to the
real value of the property-a value
nearly always conjectural, and very often
imaginary. It has recently become the
practice to divide the capital stock into
100,000 shares, of the value of $100
each, making $10,000,000 in all, a sum
which it is apparent can have no reference to any estimate of the real or intrinsic value of what is usually a mere hole
in the ground, supposed to afford favorable indications."
And Judge SAWYR
holds that from these circumstances there
arises no ex contractu obligation to take.
and pay for their stock. See also, In re
South Hountain C. iMf. Co., 8 Saw. 366.
Mr. Morawitz, speaking of this custom, says: "This practice is so universal and so notorious, that a person who
contracts with an ordinary mining company, may usually be presumed to have
contracted with a view to such security
as the property transferred to the company may furnish, irrespective of the capital indicated by its charter. The person so
contracting would, therefore, have no
equitable claim against the shareholders
for unpaid capital, if their shares were declared paid up as between themselves and
the company :" 2 Morawitz on Corporations, 830. Such being the usage and
custom with reference to mining companies, a person dealing with them may
fairly be taken to have notice thereof,
and by dealing with notice, to have assented to an arrangement by which share-
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holders are not liable for unpaid portions
of their stock. If this view is taken of
the transaction, a creditor of a mining
corporation seeking to collect an unpaid
subscription from a stockholder therein,
would fall
within the cases of Robinson
v. Bidwell, 22 Cal. 379-388; Coit v.
N. C., 4-c., Amalgamating Co., 14 Fed.
Rep. 12 ; s.c.15 Phila. 496, and Peck
v. Coalfield Coal Co., 11 Brad. 88. But
in the absence of a statute like that in
California, or in the absence of some
custom relaxing the rule as to the liability of shareholders, for unpaid subscriptions to their stock-, mining stockholders
are liable the same as any shareholders
for the fall par value of their shares. As
remarked by Mr. Wade, "The rights
and liabilities of members of mining
companies are distinguished from those
of co-tenants and partners, by the same
rules that obtain respecting other business corporations, except as they are
varied by statute:" Wade's Am. Min.
Law, 152.
There is, in England, a peculiar form
of mining company, known as "costbook mining companies."
These are
formed by agreement of a number of
men, who, having got permission to work
a lode, agree to share the enterprise in
certain proportions. They seldom agree
on a fixed capital, but appoint an agent,
commonly called a purser, to manage the
mine, subject to the control of the shareholders. They write in a book called
"the cost book," the agreement into
which they have entered, and insert in
this book, from time to time, the receipt
and expenditures of the mine, the names
of the shareholders, their respective accounts with the mine, and transfer of
shares. The shares are transferable,
and may be relinquished. They may
also be sold by thecompanyfor non-payment of calls, and those circumstances,
rather than any other, distinguish costbook mining companies from common
partnerships : 1 Lind. on Partnership
*147.

Although these associations are called
companies, yet Mr. Justice LizeDLEr appears to consider them more in the nature
of partnerships than corporations Concerning them and the liability of shareholders in them, he says : "cost-book
mining companies are sometimes represented as differing essentially from ordinary partnerships. But there is no authority for this statement, and it may be
said with more truth, that cost-book mining companies are mere partnerships governed by the general law of partnership,
except so far as chat law is excluded by
local custom or by special agreement,
referring to and embodying such custom:" 1 Lind. on Partnership *147.
See also, 32 & 33 Vict. 19 ; Tapping's
Readwin Prize Essay on Cost-Book;
Collier on Mines, 2 Edw. III. ; Batten's
Stannaries' Act 1869.
Mr. Justice
LIxDLEY further says: " Some persons

imagine that the liability of shareholders in cost-book mining companies, is
limited. That both their past as well as
their future liability is got rid of as soon
as they have transferred their shares ;
and that they are in no case liable for
the debts of the mine, if they have paid
the calls which may have been made upon their shares. All this is mere delusion,
and although it is tre that a shareholder
can, as between himself and co-shareholders, get rid of his liability by transferring or relinquishing his shares: (citing Fenn's Case, 4 DeG., M. & G. 285 ;
Mayhew's Case, 5 Id. 837 ; . Bodmin's
United Mines, 23 Beav. 370 ; Birch's
Case, 2 DeG. & J. Io ; Lofthouwe's Case,
Id. 69.) There is no authority whatever, for saying that the liabilities of the
shareholders to creditors were, until
lately, governed by principles in any respect different from those which applied
to ordinary partnerships; (citing Tredwen v. Bourne, 6 M. & W. 461 ; Newton
v. Daiy, I Fos. & Fin. 26; Lanyon v.
Smith, 3 B. & Sm. 938; Harvey v.
Clough, 2 N. R. 204; Etlis v. Schmaock,
5 Bing. 521 ; Peel v. Thomas, 15 C. B.
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714; Toll v. Lee, 4 Ex. 230, where to recover of V. B., as the amount
shareholders in a cost-book mine were unpaid upon the stock, a .proportionate
held liable to creditors for goods supshare of the difference between the par
plied. By the Stannaries' Act 1869 (32
value of the stock so transferred, and
& 33 Vict. c. 19, sect. 25), however, a
the cost of performance, it appeared
past shareholder is not liable to contribute
that the contract was entered into and
to the assets of the company, if he has assignment made, in good faith, after full
ceased to be a shareholder two years or
deliberation and consultation, with the
upwards before the mine ceased to be
knowledge and assent of all the directors
worked, or before the date of the windand the stockholders of the company, as
ing up order :" I Lind. on Partnership
the only means to insure the construction
*147.
of the road, and that the amount exConcluding with reference to mines, it pended exceeded the actual value of the
may be laid down as a general proposistock and bonds delivered in payment :
tion, that in the absence of a custom or
held, that the stock so transferred was
statute, shareholders in a mining corpo- to be considered as full paid up stock,
and that the action was not maintainable.
ration are liable for the par value of shares
As to whether, had said defendant realsubscribed by them, and if a custom to
the contrary is relied upon to exonerate a ized a sum beyond the amount actually
expended, it would have enured to the
shareholder from liability, such custom
must be proved ; it will not be judicially benefit of the company : Quare, Van Cott
v. Van Brunt, 82 N. Y. 535. This denoticed. See Hawkin's Case, 2 K. & J.
cision, although at variance with the cur253; Bodmin's United Mines, 23 Beav.
370; Fenn's Case, 4 DeG. M. & G. rent of authority, appears to be sound.
285; Hart v. Clarke, 6 Id. 232 ; 6 H. L.
It is to be noted that the defendant, alC. 633; Sibley v. Minton, 27 L. J. Ch. though a holder of stock, was not a subscriber therefor. The rule making share.
53 ; Hybart v. Parker, 4 C. B. (N. S.)
holders liable for any unpaid balance
209.
There are one or two cases which on their stock, rests upon the fact of their
having made a contract so to pay for
appear to conflict with the rule that a
subscriber to an ordinary corporation is their stock ; but in this case, there was
no subscription for the stock by Van
liable for the full par value of stock taken
by him. One of these cases is Van Cott Brunt, the defendant, and hence no conv. Van Brunt, 82 N. Y. 535. Defendant
tract under which he could be held liable
for an unpaid balance. The case appears
V. B., being the president and a director
to be within the line of authorities reof the H. A. Rd. Co., as such president
entered into a contract with C., by which
ferred to in Aug. & Ames on Corporathe latter agreed to build and equip a
tions, sect. 590 a, wherein it is said
portion of the road, for a certain sum in
that "an agreement is often made by
the stock of the company, and for a cer- railroads to pay the persons building them
tain sum in its bonds. Immediately aftera certain proportion of the contract price
wards, and in accordancewith a previous
in stock. Under such a contract, the
arrangement, the contract was assigned contractor is entitled to the proportion in
stock at its current market value at the
by C. to V. B., who, with others assotime payment should have been made
ciated with him, performed the contract
and if the stock depreciate so that it has
at an expense less than the par value of
the stock and bonds agreed to be paid no market value, the amount agreed to
therefor, which they received. In an be paid in stock must be paid in money:"
see Hart v. Lauman, 29 Barb. 410;
action by plaintiff, among other things,
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Moore v. H. Ri. Rd., 12 Id. 156 ; Porter v. Buckf dd Branch Rd., 32 Me.
539.
And in Otterv. Breevoort Petrolewn Co.,
50 Barb. 247, itis held that an agreement
by an incorporated company, to sell shares
of its own stock for less than par, is valid
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on the face of it, binding the conpany to
deliver the stock. But in this case, the
court avoided the question of public
policy, and as to the rights of creditors
by saying that the facts were not before
the court to raise this question.
AELBMERT HAMILTON.

Supreme Court of IJinois.
HOLTZMAN v. HOY.
In an action for damages for negligence and unskilfulness on the part of defendant,
as a physician and surgeon, in the treatment of plaintiff's leg, the want of professional skill of the defendant is put in issue, and the burden of proof is on the plaintiff.
The .proper and only mode of showing want of skill on the part of the defendant
was by proving that he did not exercise it; it could be neither established nor disproved by showing his general professional reputation; hence the question asked of
a witness as to what his reputation is, in the community and among the profession,
as being an ordinarily skilful and learned physician, was properly disallowed.
ERROR to the Appellate Court, Second District, to review a
judgment affirming a judgment of the Circuit Court of Livingston
county against defendant, in an action to recover damages for negligent and unskilful treatment by a physician and surgeon.
The facts are stated in the opinion.

Steven8on & Ewing, for plaintiff in error.
Straw&

Patton, for defendant in error.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
MULEY, J.-The present writ of error brings

before us for
review a judgment of the Appellate Court for the Second District,
affirming judgment of the Circuit Court of Livingston county in
favor of Joseph Hoy, the defendant in error, and against Samuel
E. Holtzman, the plaintiff in error, for the sum of $2500.
The action in form was trespass on the case, and the cause of
action was alleged negligence and unskilfulness on the part of the
defendant, as a physician and surgeon, in the treatment of the
plaintiff's leg for serious and complicated fracture.
The case is submitted here on the briefs and arguments filed in
the appellate court, and, as it most usually happens when this course
is pursued, they are, in the main, occupied with a discussion of
controverted questions of fact, a matter with which we have no con-
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cern. The case, so far as it is open to review here, is brought
within a very narrow compass, and may be disposed of in a few
words.
On the trial below, the court refused to permit Dr. Gaylord, one
of the defendant's witnesses, to answer the following question: "I
will ask you what his (Dr. Holtzman's) reputation is in the community and amongst the profession as being an ordinarily skilful and
learned physician ;" and the court's action in disallowing the question is assigned for error. Waiving the formal objections to this
question, which are apparent, we have no doubt of the correctness of
the ruling of the court upon it.
The duty which the defendant as a physician and surgeon owed
the plaintiff was to bring to the case in hand that degree of knowledge, skill and care which a good physician and surgeon would
bring to a similar case under like circumstances.
While this rule, on the one hand, does not exact the highest
degree of skill and proficiency attainable in the profession, it does
not, on the other hand, contemplate merely average merit. In other
words, in order to determine who will come up to the legal standard
indicated, we-are not permitted to aggregate into a common class the
quacks, the young men who have had no practice, the old ones who
have dropped out of the practice, the good, and the very best, and
then strike an average between them. This method would evidently
place the standard too low.
As a physician or surgeon cannot bring the requisite bill to any
case unless he has it, it follows the professional skill of the defendant was, if not in express terms, at least by implication, put in issue
in this case; and the onus probandi was upon the plaintiff to show
his want of such skill. The proper and only mode of doing this
was by proving that he did not exercise it in the treatment of the
plaintiff's leg. It does not, however, follow that because the defendant's skill, or rather the want of it, was put in issue, it could be
either established or disproved by showing his general reputation.
While his skill, or. the want of it, was put in issue, his reputation
in that respect was not put in issue, and therefore evidence to establish it was properly excluded. Suppose it appeared from the evidence that the treatment of the plaintiffs leg was proper and in
every respect according to the most approved surgery, and evidence
of the character offered had been admitted, would it have availed
the plaintiff anything if it further appeared from the evidence that
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the defendant was generally reputed to be an unskilful and unsafe
surgeon ? Sgurely not. The hypothesis here suggested, as we conceive, is but a presentation, from a different standpoint, of the
principle contended for, but in a way that more forcibly illustrates
its unsoundness. There are many reasons outside of those mentioned
why evidence of this character is not admissible.
First, its bearing upon the issue is too remote and in many, if not
in most cases, it would tend to mislead the jury rather than enlighten
them. The veriest quack in the country, by his peculiar methods,
not unfrequently becomes very famous, for the time being, in his
own locality; so much so that every person in the neighborhood
might safely testify to his good reputation. It is true that one's
reputation thus acquired is generally of short duration. His patrons
sooner or later must pay the penalty of their credulity by becoming
the victims of his ignorance, and with that his good name vanishes.
Yet, according to the principle contended for, the quack, in such
case, when called to account for his professional ignorance, might
successfully entrench himself behind his previous good reputation.
Again, one may in many respects be a good practitioner, and
deservedly stand well in the neighborhood in which he lives, and
yet, at the same time, be grossly ignorant about some matters in the
line of his profession which would render him liable, if by reason
thereof his patient should be improperly treated and thereby subjected to loss or injury. In such case, it is manifest, evidence of
the defendant's good reputation would be no answer to an action
brought for'the injury sustained, and its admission would be clearly
calculated to mislead the jury.
Other illustrations might be given of the impropriety of admitting such testimony, but it is not necessary to do so.
The general view here presented, we think, sufficiently meets the
main points made by counsel for plaintiff in error upon the defendant's refused instructions, and for this reason we do not deem it
necessary to discuss them in detail. Suffice it to say in general
terms that, taking the instructions as a whole, we think the law, as
applicable to the case made by the evidence, was fairly laid down to
the jury, and that in this respect plaintiff in error has no ground
to complain.
In this connection it may be added that the opinion in this case
delivered by Mr. Justice BAKER in the appellate court (19 Brad.
Ill. 459) discusses the questions made upon the instructions in a
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very full and elaborate manner, and we are fully satisfied with the
view taken of them in that opinion.
Judgment affirmed.
1.

GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE PHYSI-

Where
one holds himself out to the public as
having professional skill, and offers his
services to those who accept them on that
supposition, he is responsible for want
of the skill he pretends to, even when
his services are rendered gratuitously :"
Cooley on Torts 650. But where there
is no undertaking for skill, the want of it
can create no liability: Beardslee v.
Richardson, II Wend. 25; Shields v.
Blackburne, I H. Bl. 158. "Where
friends and acquaintances are accustomed
to give, and do give, to each other vol.
untary services, without expectation of
reward, either because other assistance
cannot be procured, or because the means
of parties needing help will not enable
them to engage such as may be within
reach, the law will not imply an undertaking for skill, even when the services,
are such as professional men alone are
usually expected to render:" Cooley on
Torts 650. Hence, under such circumstances, the one who undertakes to administer treatment in case of sickness,
either voluntary or by request, is only
liable for gross negligence. "But if by
forcing himself into a case he excludes a
competent physician, he is liable for
culpa levis, or the lack of the diligence
of a specialist :" Whart. on Neg., sect.
732, p. 622 ; Hord v. Gfrines, 13 B.
Mon. 188; Ruddock v. Lowe, 4 F. & F.
519.
Hence, it may be said generally that
the liability of one rendering medical
services is measured by the amount of
skill he undertakes to show. "The
foundation of the doctrine is that one who
undertakes any office, employment, duty
or trust, contracts to perform it with integrity, diligence and skill :" 20 Am.
Law Rev. 80; 3 B. Com. 165; SumcrAN's

LIABILITY is BASED.-"

ner v. Udey, 7 Conn. 263. He must
bring that amount of skill to the execution of his services, which he has undertaken to show, whether or not it is done
gratuitously: Whart., sects. 493, 500 ;
Smith on Neg. pp. 9, 126. But in England, prior to the stats. 21 & 22 Vict.,
ch. 90, sect. 31, as a physician could nor
maintain an action for his fees, except
upon an express contract, he was held
liable only for gross negligence ; while a
surgeon or apothecary, being entitled to
,recover compensation, were subject to the
usual rule of accountability: 20 Am. Law
Rev. 80, 81 ; Shear. & Redf. on Neg.,
p. 509, sect. 431. It is believed that
this distinction never existed in America.
The Supreme Court of Illinois expressly
rejected it, in MeNevins v. Lowe, 40 Ill.
209, where it is said : "If a person holds
himself out as a physician he must be held
to ordinary care and skill in every case
of which he assumes charge, whether in
the partictular case he has received fees
or not."
II. Tir CONTRACTTIMPLIED. The Supreme Court of New Hamplhire, in Leighton v. Sargent, 27 N. H. 460, states the
contract of the physician and surgeon as
follows: "By our law a person who offers
his services to the community generally,
or any individual, for employment in any
professional capacity as a person of skill,
contracts with his employer: 1. That he
possesses that reasonable degree of learning, skill and experiencewhich is ordinarily possessed by the professors of the
same art or science, and which is ordinarily regarded by the comrunity and
by those conversant with that employment as necessary and sufficient to qualify him to engage in such business."
2.
"That he will use reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the exertion
of his skill and the application of his
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knowledge, to accomplish the purpose for
which he is employed. He does not undertake for extraordinary care or extraordinary diligence any more than he does
for uncommon skill." 3. "In stipulating to exert his skill and apply fis
diligence and care, the medical and other
professional men contract to use their best
judgment." "This is believed to he an
accurate statement of the implied promise :" Cooley on Torts 649. The rule
commonly applied to all cases where
skilled labor is employed and required is
the criterion by which the physician's
liability is determined. He is not presumed to engage for extraordinary skill
which belongs to a few men only, or extraordinary endowments or acquirements
-reasonable skill constitutes the measure
of the engagement in regard to the thing
undertaken. "Every person who enters
into a learned profession undertakes to
bring to the exercise of it a reasonable
degree of care and skill. He does not
undertake, if lie is an attorney, that you
will, at all events, gain your cause ; nor
does a surgeon undertake that he will
perform a cure, nor does lie undertake to
use the highest possible degree of skill.
There may be persons, who have higher
educations and greater advantages than
he has, but he undertakes to bring a reasonable, fair and competent degree of
skill :" per TINDALL, C. J., in Lauphier
v. Phipos, 8 0. & P. 475. "The general principles of law defining the civil
responsibilities and duties of physicians,
lawyers, engineers, machinists, shipbuilders, brokers and other classes of men
whose employment requires them to
transact business demanding special skill
and knowledge are the same :" Elwell
licd. Jur. (3d ed.) 19. The following
adjudged cases fully support the doctrine
as above given : Long v. Morrison, 14
Ind. 595; Branner v. Stormont, 9 Kan.
51 ; Teft v. Wilcox, 6 Id. 46 ; Viley v.
Burns, 70 Ill. 162 ; eNevins v. Lowe,
40 Id. 209 ; Barnes v. Means, 82 Id.
379 ; Grannis v. Branden, 5 Day 260;
VOL. XXXV.-22

Landon v. Humphreys, 9 Conn. 209;
Howard v. Gover, 15 Shep. (Me.) 97 ;
Patten v. Wiggin, 51 Me. 549 ; Bollou
v. Prescott, 64 Id. 305 ; Gallagher v.
Thompson, Wright (Ohio) 466 ; Craigv.
Chambers, 17 Ohio St. 253; Potter v.
Warner, 91 Penn. St. 362; Merts v. Detweiler, 8 W. & S. 376; Bogdston v.
Giltner, 3 Oregon 118; Carpenter v.
Blake, 60 Barb. 488; Woodv. Clapp,
4 Sneed (Tenn.) 65 ; Leighton v. Sargent, 27 N. H. 460; Hesse v. Knippel,
1 Mich. (Nisi Prius) 109; Hitchcock v
Burgett, 38 Mich. 501; Reynolds v
Graves, 3 Wis. 416 ; Grahamv. Gautier,
21 Tex. 111 ; Holtzmanv. Boy, 19 Brad.
(Ill. App.) 459.

But it is to be observed that some cases
seem to indicate a tendency towards establishing a stricter accountability with
reference to medical practitioners, than
the cases just cited.
In Armond v. Migent, 34 Ia. 300, it is
said that the civil responsibility of physicians and surgeons, is not governed by
the same rules as apply to mechanics and
artisans. See, also, I Bouv. Inst. 403 ;
see comments on this tendency in Leighton v. Sargent, 27 N. H. 468, and El.
well's Med. Jour. 19, 20; Haucke v.
Hooper, 7 0. & P. 81. The measure of
the " reasonable care and skill" required,
is the average of that possessed by the
profession as a body, and not of the
" thoroughly educated :" 20 Am. L.
Rev. 83: Smothersv. Banks, 34 Ia. 286.
See the dissenting opinion of BEcK, J.,
in this case, where he declares that there
can be no such thing as "average standard." that it is entirely imaginary, andhe insists that the measure of skill and
diligence required, is that which is ordinarily exercised by the "thoroughly
educated;" citing McCandless v. McWha, 22 Penn. St. 261 ; Long v. Morrison, 14 Ind. 595 ; see also Haire v.
Reese, 7 'Phila. (Pa.) 138, which supports the high standard rule. But the
weight of authority, as stated above, is
decidedly against this rule.
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ADVANCED STATE OF PROFESSION AND
LOCALITY,

AS

ELEMENTS IN

DETER-

LIABILITY.-The
advanced
state of the profession at the date of the
treatment is a necessary element in determining whether or not the physician
exercised that skill demanded : Small v.
Howard, 128 Mass. 135 ; Sinothers v.
Hanks, 34 Ia. 286 ; Tefft v. Wilcox, 6
Kan. 46, 61 ; McCandless v. Mc
JVha,
22 Penn. St. 261 ; 20 Am. L. Rev. 84 ;
as well as the particular locality in which
the alleged negligence occurred : 20 Am.
L. Rev. 84, 85, 86 ; Gates v. -Fleischer,
30 N. W. Rep. (Wis.) 674, post.. Hence
city practitioners, where the opportunities for proficiency are vastly superior to
those of small towns or rural or sparsely
populated districts, are held to a much
higher degree of learning than practitioners in the latter localities : Id. ; T'elt
v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 63, 64. A physician
who possesses skill and neglects to use
it, is liable for all damages resulting
from such neglect: Long v. Morrison,
14 Ind. 595. By his contract he undertakes that he will use reasonable care
and diligence, dependent upon the importance and delicacy or difficulty of the
treatment: Leighton v. Sargent, 27 N.
H. 471, 472 ; 20 Am. L. Rev. 86.
IV. AS TO Tm EXERCxSE OF JJDGMENT.-While a physician is not responsible for errors of judgment, or mere
mistakes in matters of reasonable doubt
and uncertainty (Patten v. Wiggin, 51
Me. 594 ; Williamns v. Poppleton, 3 Ore.
139 ; Tefftt v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46), yet
the law requires that he exercise his best
judgment. If the error of judgment is
so gross as to be inconsistent with the
use of the degree of skill, implied by his
contract, and demanded by the law, the
physician will he held responsible : West
v. Martin, 31 Mo. 375 ; see opinion of
BELL, J., in Leighton v. Sargent, 27 N.
H. 460, as to judgment to be exercised ;
also Elwell on Med. Jur. 29; 20 Am.
L. Rev. 86, 87, 88.
"A physician who conducts himself
MINING

with propriety ought to be protected,
when he acts to the best of his skill and
knowledge. Every one is liable to commit error. The uncertainty of the medical science Is almost proverbial. Different schools entertain different and
almost irreconcilable theories as to the
nature, mode and treatment of disease.
Every case presents its own peculiar
symptoms and characteristics.
Slight
circumstances, easily overlooked, and
sometimes difficult of detection, render
cases radically different. A remedy that
would prove effective in the one would
probably prove fatal in the other. Often
many doubts and uncertainties surround
the medical practitioner. He is unavoidably exposed to mistake and error. And
the law recognising his position, only requires that he use that skill and diligence
in the exercise of his profession, as is
fairly and reasonably consistent with the
standard of his science. A contrary
rule would be unreasonable, and a higher
demand than most physicians could comply with. It would almost require the
exercise of perfect wisdom in fallible
human beings:" 20 Am. L. Rev. 87,
88.
Where errors of judgment result from
want of ordinary care and skill, the responsibility attaches, however careful
the judgment is exercised : Leighton v.
Sargent, 27 N. H. 472 Montriou v.
Jeffreys, 2 C. & P.'113 : Rartv. Frame,
3 Jar. 547 ; Elwell on Med. Jur. 31.
And in exercising his best judgment,
as consistent with reason, the physician
is only required to anticipate the natural
and probable consequences of his treatment. Thus, he cannot be held responsible for the disastrous effect, resulting
from administering chloroform as an
anmsthetie, to a patient of a peculiar
temperament, where such peculiarity is
unknown to the physician: Bogle v.
Winslow, 5 Phila. (Pa.) 136 : Com. v.
Thompson, 6 Mass. 134. The latter case
is practically overruled in Com.v. Pierce,
24 Am. L. Reg. 117 ; s. c. 6 Crim. L.
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Mag. 190; Bcalou v. Prescott, 64 Mie.
305.
V.

EVIDENCE

AS

TO

M1ODE OF

TREATmENT.-Where the mode of treatment in a given case conforms to the settled doctrines of the particular school to
which the physician belongs, he is relieved
from all responsibility, as the law favors
no school and no system of medicine is
prohibited. Hence, evidence of the practice of physicians of other schools is inadmissible: Bowman v. Woods, I G.
Greene (In.) 441 ; Patten v. Wiggin,
51 Lie. 597 ; Williams v. Poppleton, 3
Ore. 139; Corsi v. Maretzak, 4 E. D.
Smith (N. Y. C. P.) 1.
Where the case will admit of but one
mode of treatment, a different remedy
would be evidence tending to show Avant
of skill : Patten v. Wiggin, 51 Ate.
597.

The statement in the principal case,
that the want of professional skill of the
physician is put in issue, naturally follows, from the rules hereinbefore stated.
If such was not the rule of law, it would
be idle to insist that the practitioner
should be possessed of "reasonable
skill:" see Morrill v. Tegarden, 19 Neb.
535; s.0. 26 N. W. Rep. 202 ; as to
proper allegations in the petition, see
also Whittaker v. Collins, 25 N. W.
Rep. 632. But whether the rule is correct, as stated in the principal case, that
the proper and only mode of showing
want of such skill, is by proving that he
did not exercise it in the particular case,
admits of some doubts, yet, it is believed
to be in accordance with the authorities,
notwithstanding contrary intimations in
a few cases. In Mayo v. Wright, 29 N.
W. Rep. 832 ; s. c. 5 West. Rep. 595,
the action was for malpractice in treating
a fractured limb. The declaration did
not allege general incompetency of the
physician, and the court held that no recovery could be had on this ground, but
only on the ground that the physician did
not properly exercise the skill which he
in fact possessed. An inference may

follow from this, that if general incompetency had been alleged in the petition
it could be proved, and if proved a recovery had on that ground.
The treatment of each individual case
is the criterion in ascertaining the physician's liability: 20 Am. L. Rev. 89.
The Illinois Court of Appeals fully discussed this question when the principal
case was before it, Holtzman v. Hoy, 19
Brad. 459, 461, et seq. The court said :
"The issue before the jury was in respect to the propriety of the treatment in
the particular case under investigation,
and if want of ordinary skill or negligence in that case were shown, it would
have been no answer to say the physician
and surgeon had a good reputation for
skill and learning." In Mertz v.Detweiler, 8 W. & S. 376, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania say, "It may be said that
his general qualifications might serve to
shed light on the propriety of his practice in this particular instance ; but it is
a light which would be less likely to lead
to a sound conclusion than to lead astray.
The jury, assisted by the opinions of
medical witnesses, would be better able
to judge of the treatment from the treatment itself, than from the more remote
consideration of the defendant's professional reputation, which was consequently
not the evidence of which the case was
susceptible."
In West v. Martin, 31
Mo. 378, it is said : 11Whether errors
of judgment will or will not make a surgeon liable in a given case, depends not
merely on the fact, that he may be ordinarily skilled as such, but whether he
has treated the case skilfully, or has exercised in its treatment, such reasonable
skill and diligence as is ordinarily exercised in his profession."
Williams v. Poppleton, 3 Ore. 139,
expressly rules that a physician should
not be allowed to prove what is his reputation for skill in his profession ; nor is
the opinion of another physician to be
taken as to whether or not defendant is a
skilled surgeon, but the witness may state
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facts within his knowledge as to the defendant's skill.
The general opinion of the practitioner
with whom thephysician studied his profession, or of the professions of the school
at which be graduated. are inadmissible.
So evidence that he was proficient and
skilled two years previous to the treatment of the given ease, is likewise inadmissible: Leighton v. Sargent, 27 N.
H. 460.
In the recent case of Gatesv. Fleischer,
30 N. W. Rep. 674, the malpractice consisted in negligent treatment of a woman
afflicted with uterine trouble. The plaintiff recovered judgment in the trial court,
which, upon appeal, was affirmed. The
evidence tended to prove that the treatment was with caustics, that the plaintiff
had no ulcers upon her womb, or in the
cervical canal ; hence such treatment was
unjustifiable, for advanced medical science discards the use of caustics in cases
of ulceration, as a dangerous practice ;
that even if caustic treatment had been
proper, it was applied in an improper
manner by the physician; that such
treatment proved harmful, in that it
caused cicatrix in, and the closure of, the
cervical canal, producing severe and protracted pain and prostration, and, as a
consequence, greatly injuring plaintiff's
health. The evidence also showed that
plaintiff had not been guilty of any negligence or want of reasonable care of
herself., or failure to observe the proper
directions of the physician, which contributed proximately to the injury. The
trial judge instructed the jury that " the
defendant being a physician and surgeon,
and, as such, called to prescribe for, and
professionally treat, the plaintiff, he was
bound to bring to her aid and relief such
skill as is ordinarily possessed and used
by physicians and surgeons in the vicinity
or locality in which he resides, having
regard to the advanced state of the profession at the time of the treatment ;"
which the Supreme Court held to he a
correct statement of the rule.

The limb upon which the alleged malpractice occurred, can not be exhibited to
the jury after lapse of several years:
Carstens v. Hansdman, 28 N. W. Rep.
159 ; s. c. 27 Id. 18. Whether in any
case it can be done, query? Id.
The mere fact that the physician refuses consultation with other men of his
science, is no assumption upon his part
that he is possessed of more than ordinary
skill, and his declination in this regard
does not vary the application of any of
the rules above stated : Potter v. Warner, 91 Penn. St. 362; State v. Baker,
2 Wils. 359 ; Pattenv. Wiggins, 51 Me.
594.
VI. EFFECT OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.-Consistent with reason and
law, the contributory negligence of the
patient in causing the damage will pre
cludea recovery : Thomp. onNeg. 1215,
sect. 63, and cases ; Smith v. Sinith, 2
Pick. (Mass.) 621 ; Chamberlain v.
.orter, 9 Minn. 260; Geiselman v. Scott,
25 Ohio St. 86. The general principles
of the doctrine of contributory negligence
are applicable : Shearm. &Redf. on Neg.
sects. 34 and 37, and note. Negligence of the nurse concurring with that
of the physician is imputable to the
patient: Potter v. Warner, 91 Penn. St.
362 ; but if the acts of negligence can
be so separated as to show that the injury proceeded solely from the fault of
the physician ; i. e., if the latter's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury, and that of the nurse only being
remotely connected therewith, an action
will lie against the physician: Hibbardv.
Thompson, 109 Mass. 289. See Gates
v. Fleischer,30 N. W. Rep. 674, where
an instruction to the effect that if the ill
health of the patient was caused, in whole
or in part, by septicemia or blood poison
(the patient not being treated for this
trouble), and the weakness and debility
since, is the result, in whole or in part,
of the effects of blood poisoning, no recovery can be had, was held properly
rejected. If this were the law, "a person
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suffering from one disease could never
recover damagei for malpractice of a
physician who treats him for another disease, no matter how gross and inexcusable such malpractice, or how grievous
the injury caused thereby :" Id.
"It is the duty of the patient to cooperate with his professional adviser, and
conform to the necessary prescriptions,
if they are such as an ordinarily proficient
physician would dictate. But iflhe does
not do so, either wilfully or because of
pain, the physician is not responsible:
1cCandless v. MlfcWza, 22 Penn. St.
262 ; laire v. Reese, 7 Phila. (Pa.)
139. But if the physician's improper
treatment is much aggravated by improper care of those in charge, this does not
relieve the physician of the consequences
of his own acts, yet this fact will operate
to reduce the damages. This for the
reason that the cause of action becomes
perfect before the mismanagement of the
nurse supervenes: Wilmot v. Howard,

39 Vt. 447. So, a physician is responsible for his wrongful acts and unskilfulness, although the case is given over to
another, who might have discovered the
error by care and skill: Rathorn v.
Richmond, 48 Vt. 559. Here, as in all
cases of contributory negligence, the
capacity of the party injured to judge of
the probable results is an important element. Hence, if the patient be insane,
he is not chargeable with contributory
negligence: -People v. N. Y. Hospital,
3 Abb. (N. C.) 229. And it should be
observed, that where the patient relies on
his own judgment, and not upon that
of the surgeon, as to the propriety of an
operation, the surgeon is not liable for
injurious consequences arising therefrom:
Hancke v. Hooper, 7 C. & P. 81 ; Gramm
v. Boener, 56 Ind. 497.
Volenti non fit
injuria." 20 Am. L. Rev. 91, 92.
EUGENE MCQUILLIN.
St. Louis, Mo.

Supreme Court of Rlhode Island.
AMERICAN SOLID LEATHER BUTTON COMPANY v. ANTHONY,
COWELL & CO., ET ALS.

Numbers arbitrarily chosen may be taken as trade marks and will be protected as
such.
But numbers already in use and known to the trade in connection with given
styles of goods cannot be appropriated to his exclusive use by a maker of such styles
of goods.

BILL Ix EQUITY for an injunction and an account.
W. W. &' S. T. Douglas, for complainant.

Warren B. Pearce,for respondents.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STINESS, J.-The complainant is a manufacturer of buttons and
nails, with solid leather heads. In order to distinguish the different styles which it manufactures, it has assigned certain numerals,
arbitrarily chosen, e. g. 30, 40, 60, 70, 111, etc., to designate each
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style of head, on its advertising cards and packing boxes. The
several styles made by the complainant have become associated
with and known by these numerals, in the trade, and the numerals
are commonly made use of in orders and other designations of -a
style desired to be referred to.
The defendants, Anthony, Cowell & Co., have procured from
other parties, nails of different styles, similar to those made by the
complainant, and have designated them by the same numerals
adopted by the complainant to designate the corresponding styles
of its manufacture, whereupon, the complainant, claiming the
several numerals adopted by it as its trade mark, brings this bill for
an injunction and account. The first question presented for our
decision is, whether the use of an arbitrary combination of figures
to designate the styles of goods which a person makes, is entitled
to protection. The defendants claim that no protection can be
given, because such figures, by denoting the style or quality simply,
and not origin of the goods, deceive nobody and hence the rights
of the complainant are not infringed. There is some diversity in
decisions upon this point, arising mainly from different assumptions of fact by the courts. Undoubtedly, if it be assumed that
a given mark indicates quality only, and not origin, it will follow
that purchasers of goods, so marked, have not been misled thereby
into the supposition that they were buying a complainant's goods,
and hence he would show no case for relief. All of the cases cited
by the defendants, in support of their claim that numbers indicating
style or quality cannot be protected, are based upon such an assumption. Where the premises are true no fault can be found with the
conclusion. But it by no means follows, as a rule of law, that
marks indicating style or quality may not also indicate origin, and
thus be a subject of trade mark. A person has the right to affix
to his goods any device, symbol or name, which he may invent, to
distinguish such goods from those made by other people. When
the symbol becomes known, in connection with his name, it serves
as a sign and pledge of the origin of the goods. People do not often
stop toread all that may be printed on a label ; nor do they always
know the changes that are made in firms or business names. Hence
it is, that the sight of a familiar symbol inducing one to purchase
goods to which the symbol does not properly belong, to the injury
of him who devised it to mark his own goods, is the gravamen of
the law of trade marks.
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Within limits, which are well defined, a combination of letters or
figures, arranged for convenience or to attract attention, may serve
the purpose of a trade mark, as well as a device invented or arbitrarily selected. So a person may have different symbols for different grades of goods, which, in the same way, will indicate both
quality and origin, with respect to the goods so marked.
A manufacturer may adopt such symbols, not simply to mark a
style or quality, but his style and his quality as well. He is entitled to have his style and his quality protected from misrepresentation, and to have the benefit of any favorable reputation they may
have gained. The doctrine applicable to cases of this character is
clearly set forth in Shaw Stocking C(o. v. Maclk, 21 Blatchf. 1, 6,
as follows : "It is very clear that no manufacturer would have the
right exclusively to appropriate the figures 1, 2, 8 and 4, or the
letters A, B, 0 and D, to distinguish the first, second, third and
fourth quality of his goods, respectively. Why ? Because the
general signification and common use of these letters and figures
are such that no man is permitted to assign a personal and private
meaning to that which has, by long usage and universal acceptation,
acquired a public and generic meaning. It is equally clear, however, that if, for a long period of time he had uied the same figures
in combination, as "3214,"to distinguish his own goods from those
of others, so that the public had come to know them by these
numerals, he would be protected. The courts of last resort in Connecticut, in Massachusetts and in New York have distinctly held
this doctrine: Boardmanv. Meriden Brittania Co., 85 Conn. 402;
Lawrence Co. v. Lowell Mills, 129 Mass. 325; Gillott v. -Esterbrooc, 48 N. Y. 374, the numerals sustained being respectively,
"2340," "523," and "30 3 ." In this case the numerals "830"
had been adopted to mark a style of hose made by the complainant,
viz., a mottled drab, and although the label used by the defendants
bore their own and not the complainant's name, an injunction was
granted against their use of the numerals, upon the ground "that
the complainant had used these numerals long enough to convey to
any one versed in the nomenclature of the trade a precise understanding of what goods were intended, when the numerals were
used alone, disconnected from any intrinsic information." The
defendants in the case last quoted, as in the case before us, were
dealers and not manufacturers.
In Manufacturing Co. v. Trainer, 101 U. S. 51, strongly relied
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on by the defendants, the court based its decision upon the fact that
the letters "A. C. A." denoted quality simply, and not originJudge CLIFFORD dissented from this conclusion of fact. If, as
stated in that case, indication of origin, is "entirely overborne by
the patent fact that the label discloses the name in full, of the manufacturers," we do not see why any trade mark, coupled with the
name of the real manufacturers, might not be used, for according to
the language of the opinion, the indication of origin by the use of
the trade mark would be " overborne" by the disclosure of the
maker's name. We do not think the court meant that the case
should go to this extent. It simply found that the letters in that
case did not indicate origin, and hence dismissed the bill.
Applying the rule, which we have here recognised, we come to
the questions of fact in this case. It appears from the testimony
that the numbers "60" and " 70" were used by T. F. N. Finch,
and had become known to the trade as applied to the same styles,
before the complainant used them. If this be so, the complainant
cannot appropriate these numbers to its exclusive use. The only
other numbers proved to have been here used by the defendants, Anthony Cowell & Co., are" 30" and "11M." We think these numbers
indicate origin as well as style. The fact that orders for goods refer
to numbers, which have become associated with a particular style
of nail only by the complainant's association of the number with
the style, raises a natural inference that persons ordering by that
number suppose they are ordering goods of a style made by the complainant. We therefore think that in the use of these numbers, as
against the defendants Anthony, Cowell & Co., the complainant is
entitled to protection according to the prayer of the bill. As to the
other defendants, in the absence of testimony to show their use of
any numbers claimed by the complainants, other than " 60" and
"70," the bill must be dismissed.
The rule that a trade mark must indicate the "origin or ownership" of the
goods to which it is attached, is subject to
the qualification that the indication may
be direct or " by association," and the
qualification may now be considered as
well settled as the rule. It is needless
to cite authorities in support of this ; the
case which most positively denies the
qualification of the rule will be referred
to hereafter. The principal case, and all

others where an arbitrary word, sign or
symbol is used as a trade mark, depend
for the validity of the trade mark upon
the indication of origin or ownership by
association.
It will be of interest to review the
cases in which has been considered the
question whether numerals can be trade
marks; premising that of course a number which merely indicates quality is in
the same category with words and letters
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having a like office, and cannot be a
trade mark.
In Ex parte Dawes and Fanning, 1
Off'. Gaz. 27, " 140" was allowed to be
registered as a trade mark for umbrellas,
Commissioner Leggett saying: "It is
an arbitrary combination of numerals,
having, as used, no other meaning than
to distinguish the applicant's goods in
the market, and indicating to purchasers
that all umbrellas bearing this mark
have one and the same origin. It is true
'140' is a common arrangement of numerals ; but a common word or figure
may be used as a trade mark, provided
it is not used with its ordinary signification."
In Dawes v. Davies, N. Y. C. P.,
Sebastian's Digest of Cases of Trade
Marks 426, plaintiff, an umbrella manufacturer, used as his trade mark the
number " 140," and the defendants
used " 142." An injunction was refused
on the ground that different numerals
were commonly used in the trade as
trade marks, and that it was not probable that persons of ordinary intelligence
would be deceived.
Gillott v. Esterbrook 48 N. Y. 374; 8
An. Rep. 553. Gillott, as early as
1839, made a pen of a peculiar styleand
pattern, on which was impressed the
number "303," ana the words, "Joseph Gillott, extra fine." The said number was so impressed on said pen by the
plaintiff before it had been used by others
to distinguish such pattern or character
of pen from other patterns made by him,
and was adopted and used by him as his
trade mark for said pen in connection
with his name and the words " extra
fine," and ithad become established and
well known as such. The figures were
selected arbitrarily, and of themselves
expressed no quality or size of the pen,
and no other pens were then used which
had said numerals impressed thereon.
Defendants manufactured and sold a
similar pen upon which, in the same
place as upon the plaintiff's pen, were
VOL. XXXV.-23

impressed the said numeral "303" and
the name of the defendant's firm "Esterbrook & Co.," and the words "extra
The boxes in which the pens
fine."
were packed and the labels were also
similar. The judge further found "that
the said use by the defendants of said
numerals '303' was with a knowledge
by them of the rights of the plaintiff to
the same, and with the intent to obtain
for themselves the profits and advantages
to which the plaintiff was exclusively
entitled in the use of his said trade mark,
and to mislead the public and defraud
the plaintiff in that respect."
LOTT, Oh. J., said : "The preceding
statement of facts clearly shows that the
said number was selected and used by the
plaintiff as his trade mark, to indicate,
in connection with his name, the origin
and ownership of the said pens so manufactured by him, and not to designate
their quality merely, and that the defendants, by the adoption thereof, have done
it in fraud of his rights, and the plaintiff upon all the facts found by the judge
was entitled to the injunction granted to
him."
See 47 Barb. 455, for the report of
this case in the lower court; it there
appears that the injunction was " against
the defendant's impressing or otherwise
using the figures or numerals "303"
(which is a part of the plaintiff's trade
mark) upon their pens, or upon the
labels or boxes in which said pens are
put up by the defendants."
In .Boardman v. 3Meriden Britannia
Co., 35 Conn. 402, CARPENTER, J.,
said: " Whether in any case numbers
alone may be legitimately appropriated
as trade marks, is a question not necessarily involved in the case. It may be
difficult to give to bare numbers the
effect of indicating origin or ownership;
and it may be still more difficult to
show that they were originally designed
for that purpose ; but if it be once shown
that that was the original design, and
that they have had that effect, it may not
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be easy to assign a reason why they
should not receive the same protection,
as trade marks, as any other symbol or
device. But in this case the numbers
were associated with the name of the
petitioner, and the formi color and
general arrangement of the label ; and,
by virtue of that connection, form an
important part of the trade mark itself."
Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Lowell Hosiery
Mills, 129 Mass. 325. Plaintiff adopted
and used the numerals " 523" as part
of its trade mark. The figures were selected, arbitrarily and were of unusual
and distinctive form, and were added to
another device, to which, however, the
plaintiff had no exclusive right. Defendant's imitation was produced by
using the same figures, printed in the
same style and placed, as to other parts
of the device, in the same relative position as the plaintiff's. The court (COLT,
J.), said : "These numerals constituted
one of the most prominent features in
the plaintiff's design, and, when used in
connection with the rest of the defendanut's mark, were calculated to aid in
deceiving the public."
To what is given of the case of Shaw
Stocking Co. v.Mack,21 Blatchf. 1, and
12 Fed. Rep. 707, in the principal case,
it is sufficient to add that the same arbitrary numerals by which complainant's
goods had become known were used by
defendant ; and plaintiff's label was also
imitated in another important particular.
Humphrey's Specific Homeopathic Medical Co. v. Mentz, 14 Fed. Rep. 250.
Complainant put up in bottles certain
medicines which he called "Homeopathic
Specifics," and numbered from 1 to 35.
Defendant took bottles of about the same
size and printed on his labels " Reeve's
Improved Homeopathic Specifics" and in
eleven instances used the same numbers
to designate the remedies for the same
diseases; held, that the use of these numbers would be enjoined, but that the use
of "homeopathic specifics" would not
be. NixoN, J., said: "Mere numbers

are never the subject of a trade mark,
where they are employed to indicate
quality, but they may be where they
stand for origin or proprietorship, in
combination with words and other numerals." See also Kinney v. Allen, I
Hughes 106; Kinney v. Basch, 16 Am.
L. Reg. (N. S.) 596 ; India Rubber Co.
Rubber Comb and Jewelry Co., 13 Jones
& Spence 258 ; Avery 6- Sons v. Meikel
4- Co., 81 Ky. 73 ; Glen 4- Hall Mfg.
Co. v. Hall, 61 N. Y. 226, 19 Am. Rep.
278.
In Carver v. Bowker, Sebastian's Dig.
581, LITTLE, V. C., of Lancaster, held,
that of a series of numbers used in certain combinations which were substantially alike, except for the numbers and
variations in certain stripes, the first,
" 109," was in common use and descriptive of quality; and that although
the remaining numbers (406, 409, 413,
&c.) were not in common use, they could
not be exclusively appropriated.
It is submitted that the weight of authority is clearly in favor of sustaining
arbitrary numerals as trade marks, and
the writer can see no good reason against
so doing. " Broadly defined, a trade
mark is a mark by. which the wares of
the owner are known in the trade. Its
object is' two-fold : first, to protect the
party using it from competition with inferior articles ; and second, to protect
the public from imposition. There is
hardly a limit to the devices which may
be thus employed; the whole material
universe is open to the enterprising merchant or manufacturer. Anything which
can serve to distinguish one man's productions from those of another may be
used. The trade mark brands the goods
as genuine, just as the signature to a letter stamps it as authentic. The trade
mark may consist of a token, letter, sign
or seal. Names, ciphers, monograms,
pictures and figures may be used. Why
not numerals united ? What consistency
is there in allowing it in a combination
of letters, but denying it in a combina-
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tion of figures ?" Cox, D. J., in Shaw
Stocking Co. v. 21ack, supra. And why
may not a single numeral be a trade mark
when iteis used in an arbitrary sense, as
in Humphreyis Specific Homeopathic Afedical Co. v. Wentz, supra. The principal
case in its reasoning is in accord with the
weight of the previous cases, and can
only be said to go farther than they do
in that in it the question of an infringement of the trade mark numerals was
nakedly considered, without any accompanying imitation of other marks, names,
&c.
Not only the principal case but a number of the others referred to, necessarily
decide that a trade mark though it indicate quality or style or both, will still be
valid if it also indicates origin or ownership; as is said in the principal case, t'a
manufacturer may adopt such symbols,
not simply to mark a style or quality,
but his style and his quality as well."
The case of which mention was promised in the early part of this note, is
Ferguson v. Davol Mills, 7 Phila. 253.
This expressly decides that a trade mark
must within itself indicate origin or ownership, thus excluding the qualification
of indication by association. The case
is a common pleas case and was cited
and approved in a subsequent common
pleas case in the same county (Philadelphia), see White v. Schlect, 9 Weekly
Notes of Cases 77 ; but has been expressly departed from by another common pleas court of the same county: see
Sheppard v. Stuart, 7 Weekly Notes of
Cases 498 ; and Mr. Browne, in his
book on "Trade Mlarks," p. 150, says:
" This decision is sui generis."
Were
such a rule to prevail it is evident that
numerals could never be trade marks ;
for it is true of any arbitrary number as
of any mark or device that "it is only
by use as the device of him who distinguishes his goods by it in order that they
may be known as his, that it can ever

indicate ' true origin or ownership.' "
FINLETTER, J., in Sheppard v. Stuart,
supra. As has been already said, the
general rule is clearly the other way.
Some reference must be here made to the
well known case of 31anufacturing Co.
v. Trainer, 101 U. S. 51. Not only
does the court say, as stated in the principal ease, that the testimony of several
witnesses to the effect that they understood the letters A. C. A. were intended
to indicate the origin (Amoskeag Company) as well as the quality of the goods
to which they were attached, "is entirely overborne by the patent fact that
the label previously discloses the name in
full of the manufacturers ;" but further,
"if they (purchasers) do -not read the
name as printed, the letters are unintelligible. If an explanation be asked of
their purpose in the label, the only reasonable answer which can be given is the
one which corresponds with the fact that
they are designed merely to indicate the
quality of the goods." An explanation
of this decision, similar to that made in
the principal case, is given in Shaw
Stocking Co. v. Mack, supra. A reference to it is made in Sebastian on Trade
Marks, 2d ed., 1884, p. 53. He speaks
of the rule having been laid down too
generally in some of the American cases,
"that every word or symbol which
serves to indicate quality is incapable
of appropriation as a trade mark, the
qualification being omitted that, if such
word or symbol also serves to indicate a
particular manufacturer, the mark may
be a good trade mark," and adds, "In
Amaskeag Manuf. Co. v. Trainer, 101
U. S. 51, the Supreme Court of the
United States itself appears to have decided in favor of the wider rule." How
this decision will finally be regarded can
only be a matter of conjecture.
BENjAmiN H. Lowity.
Philadelphia.
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A bank cashing a draft does not warrant to the acceptor bills of lading attached
thereto as security.
The endorsement " for collection" by a bank on invoices accompanying bills of
lading attached to drafts is not a guaranty that the bills are genuine. It is simply
a notification that the goods are to be held for the draft, if it is not accepted.
Rumors or general reputation of bad character of the drawer do not charge a bank
genuineness of the
with bad faith in discounting a draft, and not inquiring into tile
bills of lading which purport to secure it.
Newspaper articles, showing a similar prior forgery of the drawer of a draft, with
forged bill of lading attached, are not admissible to establish the bad faith of the
bank cashing the same, the officers of which never saw them.
Declarations of the president of a bank that it was largely involved with the
drawer of a *draft with a forged bill of lading attached, and that it would have
broken off its relations with him if the business had not remained unsettled, are
inadmissible, because they have no bearing on the good faith of the officers, and the
declarations of an agent as to past transactions of his principal are mere hearsay.
The president of the bank, on examina:ion by the opposing counsel, being asked
why no particular pains were taken in this matter, after the protest, was properly
permitted to explain, notwithstanding the objection of the counsel, that the protest of
drafts was of very common occurrence, on shipments with bills of lading attached.

IN error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FIELD, J.-In October, 1861, the plaintiffs in error, Goetz and
Luening, were partners in the business of buying and selling hides
on commission, at Milwaukee, Wisconsin. At that time one Da
Bois was a dealer in hides at Kansas City, Missouri. On the 10th of
that month Du Bois telegraphed to them from Kansas City, inquiring what they could sell four hundred green salt hides for, and
what they would advance on a bill of lading of the shipment. The
firm answered by telegram, stating the market price of light hides
on that day, and that they would pay a draft. "for two-thirds value,
On the same day the firm sent a letter
bill of lading attached."
to Du Bois, repeating the message, and adding that if the hides
were in good condition and number one, they could sell them readily ; that their commission was two and a half per cent. ; and that
they would sell all hides that he might ship to the market at Milwaukee. Upon this understanding, atid during the same month,
Du Bois drew upon the firm five drafts, amounting in the aggregate
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to 89395, which were accepted, and, with the exception of the fifth
one, were paid. The fifth one, which was for 82000, was protested
for non-payment. To each of the drafts were attached a bill of
lading and an invoice of the shipment. The bill of lading purported
to have been issued by the Chicago and Alton Railroad Company,
stating that it had received hides, giving the number and estimated
weight, to be transported on the road from Kansas City to Milwaukee, and marked and consigned as follows: "To shipper's order.
Notify Goetz and Luening, Milwaukee, Wis." The invoice purported to give the net weight in pounds of the hides shipped, and
the market price at Milwaukee, and their estimated aggregate value,
referring to the sight draft for two-thirds of the amount.
The drafts were made payable to Thornton, the cashier of the
bank of Kansas City, and were cashed as drawn, the bank paying
their full face, less the usual rate of exchange on Milwaukee. The
amount, as each was cashed, was passed to the credit of Du Bois,
and was checked out by him in the usual course of business, within
a few days.
The drafts were sent by the bank to its correspondent at Chicago
endorsed "for collection" on its account, and by him were forwarded
to Milwaukee. The invoices of some of the shipments were endorsed in the same way. The bills of lading were endorsed by
Du Bois, per J. MacLellon, his clerk.
The signatures to the bills of lading proved to be forgeries, on
which account Goetz and Luening refused to pay the fifth draft.
The bank thereupon brought an action against them for the amount
in the Circuit Court of the United States. They defended, and
set up as a counter claim the sums they had paid on the four drafts.
At the same time, they commenced an action in the state court
against the bank to recover the money paid on those four drafts.
The latter action was removed, on application of the bank, to the
Circuit Court of the United States, where the two actions were
consolidated and tried as one, the same questions being involved in
both. The trial resulted, by direction of the court, in a verdict for
the bank, by which it recovered against the firm the amount claimed
on the unpaid draft, and defeated the claim of the firm for the
return of the money paid on the other four drafts.
The contention of Goetz and Luening was substantially this, that
they accepted the drafts in the belief that the bills of lading were
genuine; that their genuineness was asserted by the endorsement
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of the 'bank on the invoices accompanying them; that the bills of
lading were forgeries ; that no shipments as stated therein had been
made; and that Da Bois bore in the community such a reputation
for dishonesty, having been charged at other times with forging
bills of lading attached to drafts drawn by him; that the bank was
guilty of culpable negligence, amounting to bad faith, in discounting these drafts on the faith of the bills of lading presented by him
without inquiring as to their genuineness.
The testimony offered by the firm respecting the character of DIu
Bois was of great length, but it would serve no useful purpose to
discuss it. It is sufficient to say that it consisted of a mass of loose
statements, general charges of criminality, with vague references in
some instances to reported particulars, sensational articles in newspapers, surmises, insinuations, rumors, beliefs and suspicions, which
might make men cautious in their dealings with him; but they were
altogether of too indefinite and uncertain a character to interdict
all transactions with him in the ordinary course of business.
Besides, testimony was produced by the bank highly favorable
to the standing and character of Du Bois. He is shown to have
been a man of great enterprise and capacity; and, just before opening business with the bank, to have been a member of the government of Kansas City, representing his ward in the common council,
and spoken of as a prominent candidate for its mayoralty. He was
-a member and director of the Board of Trade of the city, and one
of its committee on arbitration, to which business disputes of its
members were referred for settlement. He had been a captain in
the Union army, and bore the reputation of a brave and gallant
officer. He was received in the best society of the city, and was
generally popular. He commenced business with the bank in March
1881, and drafts by him, cashed by the bank, amounted from $20
to $100,000 a month. Those drafts were always accompanied by
bills of lading, and not until after the discovery of the forgery of
the bills of lading in this case was it known that in any of these
transactions he had been guilty of dishonest conduct.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that, when the
drafts on the merchants in Milwaukee were presented for discount,
the bank made no inquiry as to the genuineness of the bills of lading attached to them. A bank in discounting commercial paper
does not guarantee the genuineness of a document attached to
Bills of lading attached to drafts
it as collateral security.
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drawn, as in the present case, are merely security for the payment
of the drafts. The endorsement by the bank on the invoices accompanying some of the bills, "for collection," created no responsibility on the part of the bank ; it implied no guarantee that the
bills of lading were genuine ; it imported nothing more than that
the goods, which the bills of lading stated had been shipped, were
to be held for the payment of the drafts, if the drafts were not paid
by the drawees, and that the bank transferred them only for that
purpose. If the drafts should be paid the drawees were to take the
goods. To hold such endorsement to be a warranty would create
great embarrassment in the use of bills of lading as collateral to
commercial paper, against which they are drawn.
The bank, after discounting the drafts, stood toward the acceptors
in the position of an original lender, and could not be affected in its
claim by the want of a consideration from the drawer for the acceptance, or by the failure of such consideration. This has been held
in numerous cases, and was directly adjudged by this court, in Hoffman v. The Bank of Milwaukee, 12 Wall. 181, which in essential
particulars is similar to the one at bar. There the bank had discounted drafts drawn by parties at Milwaukee, on Hoffman & Company, commission merchants of Philadelphia, to which were attached
bills of lading purporting to represent shipments of flour. Hoffman
& Company accept.d and paid the drafts. The bills of lading
proved to be forgeries, and Hoffman & Company sued the bank to
recover the money paid, It was contended that they had accepted
and paid the drafts in the belief that the accompanying bills of lading
were genuine, and that, had they known the real facts, they would
not have accepted and paid the drafts, and could not have been compelled to do so, in which case the loss would have fallen on the
bank; that is, that they paid the drafts under a mistake of facts.
But the court answered "that money paid as in this case by the
acceptor of a bill of exchange to the payee of the same, or to a subsequent endorser, in discharge of his legal obligation as such, is not
a payment by mistake, nor without consideration, unless it be shown
that the instrument was fraudulent in its inception, or that the consideration was illegal, or that the facts and circumstances which impeach the transaction as between the acceptor and the drawer were
known to the payee or subsequent endorsee at the time he became
the holder of the instrument ;" that supposing the plaintiffs accepted
the bills of exchange, upon the faith and security of the bills of
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lading attached, that fact would not benefit them, as the bills of exchange were in the usual form, and contained no reference whatever
to the bills of lading, and it was not pretended that the defendants
had any knowledge or intimation that the bills of lading were not
genuine, or that they had made any representation upon the subject
to induc.e the plaintiffs to contract any such liability ; that undoubtedly the bills of lading gave some credit to the bills of exchange
beyond what was created by the pecuniary standing of the parties
to them, but that they were not a part of those instruments, and
could not be regarded in any more favorable light than as collateral
security, accompanying the bills of exchange; and that proof that
the bills of lading were forgeries could not operate to discharge the
liability of the plaintiffs, as acceptors, to pay the amounts to the
payees or their endorsees, as the payees were innocent holders, having paid value for the same in the usual course of business.
The case of Robinson v. Re nolds, decided by the Queen's Bench,
and, on error, in the Exchequer Chamber, 2 Q. B. 196, is also
similar, in essential particulars, to the one at bar. An action of
assumpsit having been brought by the endorsee of a bill of exchange
against the acceptors, they pleaded that the drawer was in the habit
of delivering goods in Ireland to the City of Dublin Steam Company, to be carried to Liverpool, consigned and deliverable there to
his order, and of taking from the company a receipt for the goods,
bill of lading or document, which, by the custom of merchants, when
endorsed for value, passed the property in the goods and entitled the
endorsee to have them delivered to him ; that the drawer, used to
obtain advances from the National Bank of Ireland on endorsing to
it such document, and drawing and delivering to it abill of exchange
on the defendants or other person to whom the goods were deliverable; that the bank used to forward the endorsed document to
Liverpool, and to have it presented to defendants (or such other person), and on the faith thereof, the defendants (or such other person)
used to accept the bill of exchange; that the drawer pretending to
act in pursuance of such usage, fraudulently endorsed and delivered
to the bank a document in the usual form, to which the signature
of the agent of the steam company was forged, purporting that the
goods mentioned in it had been delivered to the steam company,
which was false; and the drawer, at the same time, endorsed the
bill of exchange in controversy to the bank, which advanced him
the amount on the faith of the document ; that the bank induced
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the document and had it presented to the defendants with the bill
of exchange, and requested them to accept the bill of exchange on
the faith of, and in consideration of, the delivery of the document,
which was delivered as a true one; that the defendants, in consideration of the goods mentioned in the document, and in consideration
and on the faith of it, and in ignorance of its being forged, accepted
the bill of exchange for and at the request of the bank; and that
thus the consideration for the acceptance which defendants had been
induced to make under the mistake into which they had been led by
the conduct and endorsement of the bank, wholly failed. The plea
did not allege that the bank knew the document to be forged, or
represented it to be genuine; and on that ground, after verdict for
the defendants, the plaintiffs, representing the bank, obtained a rule
nisi for a new trial, or for judgment non obstante veredicto. After
argument, the Queen's Bench made the rule absolute. In giving
its decision, Lord DENMAN said : "The plea does not show that the
plaintiffs made any representation which they knew to be false, nor
that they warranted the bill of lading to be genuine, nor does it disclose that the defendants accepted the bill of exchange on which the
action is brought, upon the faith of any assertion by the plaintiffs,
further than their endorsement upon it, that the bill of lading which
turned out to be forged, was genuine. On the contrary, it appears
by the other averments in the plea, that the drawer of the bill was
the correspondent of the defendants, and that it was upon his authentication of the bill of lading, as referring to goods which he
professed to have consigned to them, that they acted." Judgment
was accordingly ordered for the defendant non obstante veredicto.
The case having been taken to the Exchequer Chamber, the
judgment of the Court of Queen's.Bench was affirmed. TINDAL,
C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The sole
ground on which the defendant relies is, that the acceptance was
not binding on account of the total failure or insufficiency of the
consideration for which it was given, the document, on the delivery
of which the acceptance was given, having been forged, and there
never having been any other consideration whatsoever for the
acceptance of the defendants And this would have been a good
answer to the action, if the bank had been the drawers of the bill.
But the bank are endorsees, and endorsees for value; and the failure or want of consideration between them and the acceptors constitutes no defence ; nor would the want of consideration between the
VOL.'XXXV.-24
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drawer and acceptors (which must be considered as included in the
general averment that there was no consideration), unless they took
the bill with notice of the want of consideration, which is not
averred in this plea. Admitting that the bill was accepted by the
drawee at the request of the bank, and on a consideration which
turns out to be utterly worthless, the case is the same as if the bill
had been accepted without any value at all being given by the bank
to the defendants ; and, on that supposition, the defendants would
still be liable as acceptors to the bank, who are endorsees for value,
unless not only such want of consideration existed between the
drawer and acceptors, but unless the endorsees bad notice or knowledge thereof. For the acceptance binds the defendants conclusively,
as between them and every bonafide endorsee for value. And it
matters not whether the bill was accepted before or after such an
endorsement."
Many other cases to the same purport might be cited: Craig v.
Sibbett, 15 Penn. 240 ; Jtonroe v. Bordier, 8 0. B. 862; Thiedeman v. Goldschmidt, 1 De Gex, F. & J. 4; Hunter v. Wilson, 19
L. J. Exch. 8 ; Leather v. Simpson, 11 Law Rep. Eq. 898.
The bad faith in the taker of negotiable paper which will defeat
a recovery by him must be something more than a failure to inquire
into the consideration upon which it is made or accepted, because
of rumors or general reputation as to the bad character of the
maker or drawer.
The main position of the plaintiffs in error is, therefore, untenable. It only remains to say a few words respecting the exceptions
to the rejection and admission of testimony.
1. Articles from newspapers touching the conduct of Du Bois in
drawing drafts, with alleged fictitious bills of lading attached, on a
house in Buffalo two years before, were excluded as having no connection with the transactions in controversy, and it not appearing
that the officers of the bank ever saw them ; and we think the
exclusion was correct. The story of his conduct two years before
in a different transaction, however bad or even criminal it may have
been, did not show, or tend to show, bad faith in the officers of the
bank in discounting the drafts in this case.
2. The testimony of one of the plaintiffs and of one of his attorneys was offered as to declarations of the president of the bank
made several days after the last draft had been discounted, to the
effect that the bank had become largely involved in certain wool
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transactions with Du Bois, as early as July or August 1881, and
would have broken off its relations with him if it had not been that
this wool matter remained unsettled. The testimony was excluded,
and rightly so. The declarations had no bearing upon the good
faith of the officers of the bank in the transactions in this case; and,
if they had, being made some days after those transactions, they
were not admissible as part of the res geste any more than if
made by a stranger. Evidence of declarations of an agent as to
past transactions of his principal are inadmissible as mere hearsay:
Luby v. Hudson River Rd., 17 N. Y. 133 ; Adams v. H1anvibal
and St. Joseph Rd., 74 Mo. 533.
3. The testimony of the president of the bank, explanatory of the
conduct of its officers when certain drafts came back protested, was
admissible. The witness had testified, upon examination by the
plaintiffs, that the bank never had any knowledge of a forged bill
of lading by Du Bois until October 31st, 1881 ; and that it was
not a fact that he had purposely remained ignorant of the facts and
circumstances attending the protests of certain other drafts of
Du Bois, to which bills of lading were attached, which the bank
had discounted, and that he could only explain why no particular
pains were taken in the matter by stating what the usage of the
bank was in such matters. As the witness was about to state such
usage, the counsel of the plaintiffs interrupted him, and called his
attention to the question put, whether any special pains had been
taken, but the court said, let him state the usage as to such papers.
The witness then answered as follows : "No, sir; I did not take
any special pains, for the reason that it is a matter of very common
occurrence. A merchant will ship a lot of grain to New York,
the drafts come there, and for some reason a commission merchantwon't pay them; it may be that he is not in a position to do it; it
may be he thinks they are drawn for too much, and he refuses to
pay; the drafts come back, or are held under directions of the
bank for settlement or other arrangement. That is a very common
occurrence on shipments with bills of lading attached." There
could be no just objection to the court's receiving this explanation.
We see nothing in the other exceptions which requires notice.
Judgment affirmed.

